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INTRODUCTION 
The conservation of imperiled wildlife species, a fundamental objec- 
tive of the Endangered Species Act1 ("ESA"), conflicts, at times, with the 
United States' responsibilities to promote American Indian rights to gov- 
ern and develop reservation lands and resources. Critical habitat designa- 
tion in Indian Country2 poses a near irreconcilable conflict. Designation 
effectively "zones" areas within Indian Country for the benefit of a single 
listed species in accordance with federal - not tribal - prerogatives. As 
such, designation is a direct affront to tribal sovereignty. Designation can 
severely restrict a tribe's ability not only to govern, but also to conserve 
and utilize its land, diminishing the reservation's character as the single 
most important tribal resource. In turn, designation flies in the face of the 
United States' solemn promises to preserve tribal homelands for the undis- 
turbed use of Indian Nations and to protect tribal sovereignty from exter- 
nal incursions. 
Because Indian Country is typically less developed than surrounding 
private and state lands, it affords an island of suitable habitat in a sea of 
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 31 1531, et seq [hereinafter 
ESA]. Designation of critical habitat is authorized by Section 4 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533. 
2. See 18 U.S.C. $1151 (1948). "Indian country" means: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights- of-way [sic] running through the reservation, (b) all dependent 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or with- 
out the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which 
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
Id. "Indian land" describes a subset of the lands within Indian Country and generally encom- 
passes only those lands held in trust for an individual Indian or tribe. See 25 U.S.C.A. 5 3103 
(defining Indian lands as "land title to which is held by (A) the United States in trust for an 
Indian, an individual of Indian or Alaska Native ancestry who is not a member of a federally- 
recognized Indian tribe, or an Indian tribe, or (B) an Indian, an individual of Indian or Alaska 
Native ancestry who is not a member of a federally recognized tribe, or an Indian tribe subject to 
a restriction by the United States against alienation7'). The term Indian land is generally used in 
this article not as a jurisdictional limitation, but to describe the real property resource. 
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lands altered by development activities: timber harvesting; road-building; 
mineral extraction; solid and hazardous waste disposal; and agriculture. 
Not surprisingly, habitat for listed species in Indian Country - even unoc- 
cupied, marginally suitable habitat - is often viewed by federal agencies as 
desirable for inclusion in critical habitat designations. Yet, while the appli- 
cation of the ESA's habitat provisions to private property has generated a 
sustained furor among private property owners, fueling the fire for propos- 
als to amend the statute, very little attention has been given to the ESA7s 
effects on lands within Indian Country. Recently, however, decisions to 
designate critical habitat on tribal lands, particularly in the southwestern 
United States, have brought the ESA-trust responsibility conflict to a head. 
One such decision, the designation of critical habitat for the Mexican 
Spotted Owl,3 illustrates the curious dichotomy which can result when fed- 
eral agencies implement a generally applicable statute, such as the ESA, in 
the absence of concrete guidance for effectuating the United States' trust 
obligation to tribes. The owl designation illustrates both the best and worst 
possible outcomes for tribal sovereignty and self-determination, On one 
hand, the decision excluded the lands of the White Mountain and Jicarilla 
Apache Tribes, which had adopted tribal management plans protective of 
owl habitats4 This result represents the promise of mutual decision-making 
processes for imperiled species, the surrounding ecosystem and tribal inter- 
ests. At the same time, however, the lands of the Southern Ute Indian 
Tribe, which are only minimally beneficial to the species, were included in 
the designation as a result of failed communications and, ultimately, a 
heavy-handed unilateral d e ~ i s i o n . ~  
To address some of the tribes' concerns regarding ESA implementa- 
tion, the Departments of Interior and Commerce recently issued a Secreta- 
rial Order on American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust 
Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act.6 The Order, which re- 
sulted from bilateral negotiations between tribal representatives and execu- 
tive agencies, includes information exchange and consultation provisions as 
well as substantive requirements for listing and designation decisions af- 
fecting tribal resources. More specifically, the Appendix to the Order pro- 
vides that critical habitat designation should only occur in Indian Country 
if essential to conserve the species. It directs the agencies to consider 
3. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,914 
(1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
4. Id. at 29,929-31. 
5. Id. at 29,919; Southern Ute Tribe v. Babbitt, No. 96-M-1369 (D. Colo.) [hereinafter 
Southern Ute Complaint] (complaint filed June 10, 1996) (copy on file with author). The Tribe 
challenged the designation decision, alleging breach of trust and violations of various federal 
statutes, including the ESA, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (1994), and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1966 ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 9 706 
(1994). For discussion of the designation decision and litigation, see infra at Section IV.A.3. 
6. Interior/Commerce Secretarial Order 3206 - American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tri- 
bal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act (June 5,1997) [hereinafter Secretarial 
Order] (copy on file with author). 
384 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
whether conservation requirements could be met through designation of 
non-Indian lands. Thus, the Order provides a mechanism for prioritizing 
the interests of Indian tribes both in conserving species and in utilizing 
their lands for economic development, consistent with the trust responsibil- 
ity and tribal sovereignty. It is a reasoned approach to the difficult balanc- 
ing act necessitated by conflicting demands to conserve species and to 
promote the use and enjoyment of tribal trust resources. 
The Secretarial Order provides much-needed guidance to executive 
agencies. Standing alone, however, the Order, as non-binding, unenforce- 
able executive policy, does not go far enough. Indeed, the only post-Order 
decision affecting Indian Country to date, designating critical habitat for 
the Southwest Willow Flycatcher,' evidences nothing more than "business 
as usual." The Flycatcher decision gives lip service to the Order, but com- 
pletely fails to address the Order's criteria for designating tribal lands. It 
lacks any findings regarding the "essential" nature of habitat on tribal lands 
vis-a-vis surrounding areas as directed by the Order and its Appendix, and 
it appears that very little consultation occurred with the tribes prior to in- 
cluding their lands in the designation. 
As the Flycatcher decision makes clear, the Secretarial Order's re- 
quirements will be effectuated only if the Order is enforceable against the 
implementing agencies. Common law interpretations of the trust responsi- 
bility should embrace the Order's provisions, particularly those relevant to 
the designation and management of critical habitat. As an expression of 
the trust responsibility, the Order gains the binding status which it now 
lacks. 
This article begins by examining the federal trust responsibility as it 
relates to the conservation and utilization of reservation lands and natural 
resources by Indian  nation^.^ Section I1 describes the requirements of the 
ESA, particularly those which provide for the protection of wildlife habitat. 
The Secretarial Order is analyzed in Section 111. Section IV considers the 
importance of the reservation to tribal sovereignty and survival and con- 
cludes that the ESA's critical habitat provisions should apply to Indian 
lands only as a matter of last resort, and then only in accordance with the 
provisions of the Secretarial Order. 
7. Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 39,129, 39,136 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
8. A related issue arises when tribal economic pursuits in Indian Country result in "inciden- 
tal takings" of listed species in the course of otherwise lawful land development activities. 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), (0)(2); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B). See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding regulatory definition of "tak- 
ing" to apply both to activities which directly harm a listed species, such as hunting, and to activi- 
ties which degrade essential habitat, in turn, causing actual harm to the species). For extended 
treatment and analysis, see Jennifer M. Regis-Civetta, The Effect of the Endangered Species Act 
on Tribal Economic Development in Indian Country, 50 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 303 
(1996). As discussed below, I do not agree with Regis-Civetta's conclusion that the ESA should 
be strictly applied to abrogate treaty rights, even as to incidental takings. Id. at 344-45. See 
discussion, infra Section II.C.2. 
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I. THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY INCLUDES PROCEDURAL 
AND SUBSTANTIVE DUTIES TOWARD INDIAN 
LANDS AND RESOURCES 
It is well-established that, in dealing with Indian Nations, the United 
States "has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibil- 
ity and t r ~ s t . " ~  Yet, there is no constitutional or legislative provision that 
expresses the general trust responsibility in explicit terms. Instead, the 
duty arises from federal common law extending back to the landmark 
Supreme Court cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgial0 and Worcester v. 
Georgia," both penned by Chief Justice Marshall. Notably, Worcester 
founded the duty on the status of tribes as "distinct political communi- 
ties,"12 sovereign nations protected by the might of the "more powerful" 
national government: 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independ- 
ent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as 
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the 
single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded 
them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the 
first discoverer. . . . [Thus the Indian nation] does not surrender its 
independence - its right to self-government, by associating with a 
stronger, and taking its protection.13 
This language makes it clear that tribal autonomy, which is derived not 
from federal policy but from the tribes' own original, inherent sovereignty, 
is a core value of the trust relationship.14 With respect to matters of inter- 
nal self-government, tribal authority is exclusive, absent limitation by 
9. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). 
lo. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
12. Id. at 557. In Cherokee Nation, the Court described Indian tribes as "domestic depen- 
dent nations." 30 U.S. at 17. In Worcester, the Court attempted to further define the parameters 
of the federal-tribal relationship, stating that tribes have the status of sovereign nations protected 
by the might of the federal government. 31 U.S. at 555. 
13. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-60. The general trust relationship reflects "the distinctive obli- 
gation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and some- 
times exploited people." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (citing Seminole 
Nation, 316 U.S. at 296). Although the trust relationship has been criticized as a paternalistic 
outgrowth of the legal theory of conquest, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal 
Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurispru- 
dence, 1986 WIS. L. Fkv. 219, it still serves an important purpose today in that it requires a 
prioritization of Indian interests, particularly those that relate to treaty resources, over other 
federal interests, and places parameters on the otherwise sweeping discretion of federal agencies. 
14. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232 (1982). Although the 
Supreme Court has found that "discovery" by Europeans, see Johnson v. M71ntosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543,574 (1823), and incorporation into the United States placed limitations on the exter- 
nal sovereign powers of the tribes, such as the power to establish political relationships with other 
foreign nations, Worcester plainly acknowledges that Indian Nations did not lose their basic sov- 
ereign authority by virtue of their relationship with the federal government. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 
561; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. See Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on 
Indian Reservations: Overview of Tribal, State, and Federal Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
71, 74 (1992). 
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treaty or statute.'' That authority includes the power to determine tribal 
membership and the form of tribal government, to legislate, administer jus- 
tice, control activities within tribal jurisdiction, and exclude unwanted per- 
sons and intrusions from the reservation.16 
The trust responsibility to Indian Nations is further defined by treaties, 
statutes, regulations and executive orders.17 Treaties, in particular, "reflect 
a set of sovereign promises and expectations that continue to be at the 
heart of defining the modern contours of this relationship."18 Treaties rep- 
resent a bargained-for exchange in which tribes agreed to make peace and 
cede a portion of their aboriginal lands to the United States in return for "a 
cessation of hostilities, the provision of some services, and most impor- 
tantly, the establishment and recognition of a reservation homeland free 
from the incursion of both the state and nun-Indian settlers."lg In other 
words, tribes bargained for a piece of their homelands, often drastically 
reduced in size, and the right to continue to govern their own affairs.20 
Thus, the trust responsibility arises not only from the nature of the 
relationship between tribes and the United States, but also from the mas- 
sive transfer of lands from Indian Nations to the federal government and 
the retention and protection of a critical - though diminished - land 
base, as reflected in treaties.21 Just as sovereignty is at the very core of the 
trust responsibility, the tribal land base, retained by the tribes through trea- 
ties, is a critical component of sovereignty for most tribes.22 
15. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 47-48; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581, 595. 
16. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408 (1989) (noting that exclusivity has been diminished by the allotment era); Edwardsen v. 
Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding a governmental duty to prevent trespass 
on Indian lands to protect aboriginal rights to use and occupancy). 
17. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224; North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589,611-12 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). See also COHEN, supra note 14, at 220-28 (discussing the trust relationship and its 
limits on congressional power). 
18. Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place, 34 S.D. L. b v .  246,252-53 (1989) [here- 
inafter Place]. 
19. Place, supra note 18, at 253 (emphasis added). See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN 
INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 120-22 (1986) (stating that treaties represent "real promises" 
which advance the "fulfillment of the ultimate promise" - the reservation as a homeland and 
"island[ ] of indianness within the larger society"). See also id. at 100-01 (describing bargaining 
positions). 
20. See Place, supra note 18, at 254-55. Not all tribes were able to retain their aboriginal 
homelands, however. For example, the five civilized tribes of the southeastern United States (the 
Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole) were removed to the Oklahoma Territory 
in a forced migration which has since become known as the Trail of Tears. See id. at 252,254 n.26 
(citing G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL (1932)). See also DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 152-54 (3d ed. 1993) (citing RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE 
AND THE SPIRITS - CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 65-67 (1975); D'ARCY MCNICKLE, 
THEY CAME HERE FIRST 199-200 (rev. ed. 1975)). 
21. See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Na- 
tive Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises 
and Performance, 25  EN^. L. 733, 742 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton Critique]. Today, there are 
approximately 53 million acres held in trust for tribes, COHEN, supra note 14, at 471, and 57 
million total acres of Indian fee and trust lands within reservation boundaries, which represents 
three percent of the original land base, Clinton Critique, supra, at 740. Of the 2 million Indians in 
the United States, approximately half live on or near the 387 reservations. Id. at 735 n.3. 
22. See Clinton Critique, supra note 22, at 742-43 (concluding that the trust doctrine "repre- 
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Although the Supreme Court has held that Congress may wield its 
plenary power over Indian affairs to abrogate treaty rights and even to di- 
minish or extinguish the reservation land base a l t ~ g e t h e r , ~ ~  it has cautioned 
the legislature not to cast solemn treaties aside lightly.24 Moreover, execu- 
tive agencies, unlike Congress, may not unilaterally avoid the trust obliga- 
tions embodied in treaty provisions, or in legislative or executive 
Agencies must fulfill the trust responsibility in conducting any federal ac- 
tion which relates to tribal trust  resource^.^^ The duty requires federal 
agencies to deal with tribes according to the "most exacting fiduciary stan- 
dard~,"~ '  enforceable through lawsuits for monetary damagesz8 or for equi- 
sents that measure of legal responsibility on the part of the majority society to protect what the 
native population retained"). 
23. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). The Court noted that Congress has 
power to: 
abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will 
be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the govern- 
ment in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the inter- 
est of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so. 
Id. 
24. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (stating "Great Nations, like great men, should keep their word."). Congress itself, 
through the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, has proclaimed the importance of preserving 
the tribal land base by preventing alienation of Indian lands. See Joint Tribal Council of Passama- 
quoddy Tribes v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370,379 (1st Cir. 1975) (noting "[tlhat the Nonintercourse Act 
imposes upon the federal government a fiduciary's role with respect to protection of the lands of 
a tribe covered by the Act seems to us beyond question"). 
25. Compare Lone Wo& 187 U.S. at 556 (concluding that Congress possesses the power to 
abrogate Indian treaties) with United States v. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 542 F.2d 1002, 
1004-06 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the Corps of Engineers has no authority to take by eminent 
domain tribal lands reserved by treaty). For a discussion of the distinction between executive and 
congressional powers with respect to Indian trust resources, and the role of judicial review of 
equitable claims for breach of trust arising from executive actions, see Reid P. Chambers, Judicial 
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1218-48 (1975) 
(determining that although Congress is "the ultimate umpire of the purposes of the trust relation- 
ship," the trust obligation requires "strict executive compliance"). 
26. See Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that the 
agency has a trust obligation to protect wildlife upon which treaty rights depend); Nance v. EPA, 
645 F.2d 701,711 (9th Cir.) (1980) (EPA must act with the care of a trustee in approving North- 
ern Cheyenne Tribe's redesignation of air quality standards, which allegedly would inhibit coal 
mining on nearby Crow reservation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); Pyramid Lake Paiute 
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) [hereinafter Pyramid Lake Paiute 
Tribe v. Morton] (concluding that trust responsibility requires the Secretary to preserve water for 
the tribe to protect fishery resources), modified on other grounds, 360 F.  Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). 
27. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297. 
28. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 9 1491(a)(l) (1994) (providing jurisdiction in the U.S. Claims 
Court for damages claims against the United States); Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (al- 
lowing Claims Court to hear monetary claims by Indian tribes). See also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 206. 
In the context of monetary claims against the government, a breach of trust would be found 
under Mitchell only where the trust duty is (1) tied to a congressional enactment for federal 
management of trust resources, although the word "trust" or "fiduciary" need not appear on the 
face of the statute, id. at 224-25, or (2) the government has in fact assumed extensive control over 
tribal resources, id. at 222. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native 
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1519-20 (1994) [hereinafter 
Indian Land]. This is so because the Tucker Act creates jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, a 
court of limited jurisdiction, only for claims which satisfy its explicit limitations: those which are 
"founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 
department" or a contract with the United States. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(l). In con- 
SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW 
table relief.29 
Typically, breach of trust by executive agencies can occur in either of 
two ways: when an agency fails to carry out specific statutory mandates 
regarding management of tribal resources in accordance with fiduciary 
standards, or when an agency neglects tribal trust resources in executing 
general statutory authorities. Analysis of claims arising under the first cat- 
egory is relatively straightforward. Where tribes claim a breach of trust for 
mismanagement of resources, such as timber or money, the statute itself 
defines the contours of the United States' fiduciary respon~ibilities.~~ 
In the second instance, where an agency's organic statutory mandates 
impact tribal rights, which is often the case when environmental statutes 
such as the ESA are enforced, the parameters of the trust duty are more 
difficult to pinpoint. General statutory mandates which incidently affect 
the use and enjoyment of tribal property or treaty rights can severely im- 
pair or even destroy a tribe's way of life.31 In other words, agency action 
may be in strict compliance with the letter of the statute, but fail to satisfy 
the trust obligation to affected tribes. Accordingly, when federal agencies 
act to fulfill statutory mandates in the name of the public interest, they 
must also remain vigilant toward tribal interests by carefully analyzing im- 
pacts on trust  resource^.^' Agencies cannot simply make a "judgment call" 
trast, federal district courts, though also of limited jurisdiction, have more extensive authority to 
hear equitable claims. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 (1994); 5 U.S.C. 9 704. 
29. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923) (canceling land patent to railroad 
for land occupied by individual Indians); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919) 
(allowing suit to enjoin governmental treatment of Pueblo lands as public lands of the United 
States); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F .  Supp. at 257-58 (granting declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Secretary of Interior's regulations which provided for diversions of water 
from lake on tribal lands). See also Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Refa- 
tionship Affer Mitchell, 31 CATH. U .  L. REV. 635,640-41 (1982) (analyzing jurisdictional issues in 
context of breach of trust claims). Claims for equitable relief can be asserted against executive 
agencies under 28 U.S.C. $ 1331, which provides federal question jurisdiction for claims based on 
federal common law, using the APA, 5 U.S.C. $5 701-706, as a vehicle for judicial review. The 
APA provides that final agency action can be set aside as, inter alia, (1) "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law"; (2) "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, au- 
thority or limitations"; or (3) "contrary to constitutional right[s]." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(C). 
30. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224. The Court found that the Indian timber management stat- 
utes "clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and 
land for the benefit of Indians" thereby "establish[ing] a fiduciary relationship and defin[ing] the 
contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities." Id. The Court continued, stating that 
such a relationship and concomitant duty would arise wherever the government "takes on or has 
control or supervision over tribal monies or properties." Id. at 225. For the text of the Indian 
timber management statutes, see 25 U.S.C. $5 406-07, 466 (1994). 
31. See Clinton Critique, supra note 22, at 741-42, 744 nn. 31-32, n.38 (describing effects of 
diminished salmon runs in the Columbia River Basin on Umatilla Tribes' economic base, cultural 
and religious ceremonies and entire way of life; the Tribes invoke the trust responsibility in seek- 
ing enhanced water quality protection and water flows and protection of tribal treaty fishing 
rights). 
32. See Northwest Seafarms v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515 
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that, in carrying out requirements of Clean Water Act, Corps must 
ensure that treaty rights are given full effect); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United 
States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420-21 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Pyramid Lake Paiute 
Tribe v. Navy] (stating that the trust responsibility to protect tribal resources is not necessarily 
satisfied simply because the ESA's requirements have been met); Northern Arapahoe Tribe, 808 
F.2d at 750 (finding that, upon request of Shoshone Tribe, government must protect treaty re- 
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in favor of public accommodation if tribal interests would be adversely af- 
f e ~ t e d . ~ ~  The trust obligation requires agencies to protect tribal property 
interests to the greatest extent possible, although they are not required to 
ignore other competing interests.34 
The trust responsibility, in broad-brush terms, encompasses both sub- 
stantive and procedural req~irements.~' The substantive duty mandates 
the protection, as well as tribal use and enjoyment, of Indian lands and 
natural resources. The procedural duty requires meaningful tribal partici- 
pation in decisions that affect tribal resources. 
I .  Consultation 
Procedurally, agencies must carefully consider the impact of proposed 
federal actions on treaty resources.36 Agency activities which may affect 
tribal rights or resources must be implemented in a manner respectful of 
tribal ~overe ign ty .~~  Executive policy requires agencies to give tribes a 
meaningful role in assessing impacts to trust resources by consulting with 
them on a government-to-government basis.38 
Although the parameters of the duty to consult have not been well- 
defined by the judiciary, where federal activities affect trust resources, 
tribes should be entitled to greater involvement than the due process rights 
sources from "misappropriation by third parties," including overuse of game by Arapahoe, who 
occupy the Wind River Indian Reservation jointly with the Shoshone); Nance, 645 F.2d at 710 
(examining implications of the trust duty in implementing the Clean Air Act). 
33. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 256 (invalidating Department 
of Interior regulation as an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the federal common 
law of trust where agency diverted water from a tribe to satisfy non-Indian irrigation interests). 
34. Id. In carrying out their general statutory missions, however, agencies have not necessar- 
ily been held to "the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his 
single beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's 
consent." Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 859 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(Seth, J., dissenting) (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983)). In other words, 
courts allow some balancing where strict adherence to the general trust responsibility would con- 
flict with statutorily mandated duties toward the public. See New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n 
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the "commission was 
bound to consider impacts on non-Indian Americans" in conducting its public interest review 
regarding decision to grant permit to railroad to construct its line over Navajo lines; interest in 
promoting tribal self-sufficiency need not be elevated to "the status of a universal trump"); North 
Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 612-13 (finding that the Secretary has discretion under ESA to bal- 
ance subsistence needs of Inupiat with other public interests). 
35. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
36. See Klamath Tribes v. United States, No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509, at *8 (D. Or. Oct. 
2, 1996) (holding that Forest Service must consult with Tribe and consider effects of timber har- 
vest on mule deer and other tribal resources). 
37. See Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482,487-90 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that issuance 
of logging permits to members was internal matter fully within tribal authority). 
38. Presidential Memorandum, Government-to-Government Relations with Native Ameri- 
can Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994) [hereinafter President's Memorandum on 
Government-to-Government Relations]. 
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afforded n ~ n - I n d i a n s . ~ ~  Courts have noted that, "[iln practical terms, a 
procedural duty has arisen from the trust relationship such that the federal 
government must consult with an Indian Tribe in the decision-making pro- 
cess to avoid adverse effects on treaty r e s o ~ r c e s . " ~ ~  Thus, the consultation 
duty can provide a significant procedural safeguard by requiring tribal 
participation. 
The value of the processes afforded by consultation, however, is some- 
times undermined by executive and judicial action. Unless the agency's 
discretion is otherwise curtailed by specific legal standards, agencies may 
be given wide discretion to define the method and timing of con~ul ta t ion .~~ 
Moreover, courts have held that the duty to consult does not give the tribes 
a veto authority: "[c]onsultation is not the same as obeying those who are 
c o n s ~ l t e d . " ~ ~  Without some substantive standard to back up the proce- 
dural requirements, a right to consult may, in fact, be less than meaningful. 
2. Tribal Sovereignty and Resources 
Substantively, the trust obligation extends to tribal sovereignty and tri- 
39. See Northwest Seafarms, 931 F. Supp. at 1520 (noting that although agency's regulations 
do not specifically require consideration of treaty rights as part of "public interest" review man- 
dated by statute, trust and treaty obligations provide it with the authority to do so; Corps must 
ensure that treaty rights are given full effect); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. 
Rep. 3065, 3070 (D. Mont. 1985) (Interior's procedural duty to  consult with tribes regarding im- 
pacts on trust and treaty rights is violated if tribes are treated like mere citizens), remanded for 
modification of injunction, 851 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988). 
40. Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509, at *8 (citing Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Indians v. 
Washington, 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1240 (W.D.Wis. 1987); President's Memorandum on Govern- 
ment-to-Government Relations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,951). The court also noted that the Forest 
Plan governing the timber sales at issue in the case acknowledged the consultation duty, and held 
that "[a] determination of what constitutes compliance with treaty obligations should not be 
made unilaterally; rather, the Tribe's view of the hunting, fishing, gathering, and trapping activi- 
ties protected by the treaty must be solicited, discussed, and considered." Klamath Tribes, 1996 
WL 924509, at "8. A preliminary injunction issued which prohibited the Forest Service from 
proceeding with logging under the Salvage Timber Rider, P.L. 104-19, without ensuring protec- 
tion of treaty resources in consultation with the Klamath Tribes on a government-to-government 
basis. Id. at *9. See akio Lower Brule Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395,402 (D.S.D. 1995) (requir- 
ing consultation prior to reductions in force of BIA employees on reservation); Oglala Sioux 
Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that BIA's failure to 
consult with tribe before making decision to reassign Indian Superintendent violated its trust 
responsibility to the tribe as well as its own internal guidelines for consultation; two post-decision 
meetings did not constitute "meaningful consultation"). 
41. See Nance, 645 F.2d at 711. There, the Ninth Circuit was willing to defer to the adequacy 
of the agency's consultation process in a Clean Air Act dispute. The court reviewed the proce- 
dures used by EPA in determining whether the agency's approval of the Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe's redesignation of air quality standards on its reservation would violate trust responsibilities 
to the neighboring Crow Tribe, who alleged that the redesignation would adversely affect the coal 
mining activities on their reservation. The court held that, in light of the fiduciary duties owed to 
both the Crow Tribe and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, the Crow had been given a sufficient 
opportunity to participate in the decision making process through the Clean Air Act's procedural 
requirements, which provided for a public hearing and a formal protest process. Id. The court 
noted that Crow Tribe had not availed itself of the opportunity for official protest. Id. 
42. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1987). See Lower Brule 
Tribe, 911 F.  Supp. at 401. The court stated that although "meaningful consultation means tribal 
consultation in advance with the decision maker or with intermediaries with clear authority to 
present tribal views to the BIA decision maker . . . the tribe recognizes that the BIA need not 
obey the Council's decision." Id. 
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bal resources, in particular, reservation lands.43 Pursuant to the majority of 
treaties with Indian Nations, tribes ceded some of their aboriginal lands to 
the United States in exchange for the "absolute and undisturbed use" of 
retained lands.44 These retained lands are critical to tribal sovereignty and, 
indeed, the very survival of tribes as distinct cultural and political commu- 
n i t i e ~ . ~ ~  Agency decisions which affect the reservation resource implicate 
several related aspects of the trust responsibility: tribal survival, sover- 
eignty and self-deterrninati~n,"~ as well as tribal property rights and eco- 
nomic interests. 
First, development of reservation resources, more than simply a stick 
in a tribe's bundle of property rights:' is critical to the survival of Indian 
Nations as nations and to the fulfillment of tribal self-determinat i~n.~~ 
Utilization of trust lands to promote political and economic self-determina- 
tion is an important attribute of the trust responsibility toward survival of 
43. See Passamaquoddy Tribe, 528 F.2d at 379 (invalidating transfer of tribal lands to the 
state of Maine, and stating that it is "beyond question" that the federal government has a fiduci- 
ary role to protect tribal lands covered by the Nonintercourse Act, which extends to the lands of 
"any Indian nation or tribe of Indians"). 
44. See, e.g., Treaty with the Ute, March 2,1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 619; Treaty with the Sioux - 
Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, 
and Santee - and Arapaho, 1868, April 29, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter Treaty of Fort 
Laramie] (setting apart reservation for "undisturbed use and occupation" of Great Sioux Nation, 
and providing that "no persons except those herein designated and authorized so to do  . . . shall 
ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this article"). 
See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 375 (1980) (holding that Sioux Nation was enti- 
tled to compensation for abrogation of Treaty of Fort Laramie); Place, supra note 18, at 254 
(discussing importance of land base encompassed in Treaty of Fort Laramie). See also Brendale, 
492 U.S. at 414-15 (stating that provisions for exclusive use of reservation lands are common in 
many treaties); WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 16-18 (noting that "isolation of Indian societies on 
the reservation was a common policy goal"; treaties reflected this goal by providing "absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation" of the reservation and absolutely forbidding entry by unauthor- 
ized persons). Cf: Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) (preserving the native land base by 
preventing alienation of Indian lands). 
45. See Akins,l30 F.3d at 490 (finding that a "significant geographical component" is inher- 
ent in tribal sovereignty) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 448 U.S. 136, 
151 (1980)). See also Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 740, (stating that "[wlithout an ecologi- 
cally viable land base and an adequate supply of corollary resources to support a tribal commu- 
nity and economy, the promise of true autonomy is beyond the grasp of the native nations."). 
With respect to tribal survival, see infra, at Section IV.A.l (equating reservations to "critical 
habitat" for Indian Nations). 
46. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Law in an Era of Self-Determination: The 
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 229 (1996) 
(stating that self-determination effectuates tribal identity and authority through "principles of 
group rights, autonomy, and national integrity"). 
47. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (determining that Congress' efforts to ame- 
liorate effects of fractionalization of Indian lands by preventing the descent or devise of small 
fractionated interests in vrovertv to heirs. which would instead escheat to the tribe. destrovs an 
important strand in the dundle df property rights) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United ~ta'tes, 444'u.s. 
164 (1979)). 
48. S& WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 108 (tribes have both proprietary and governmental 
interests in economic development of the reservation; "measured separatism cannot exist without 
a viable economic base"); Tsosie, supra note 46, at 291 (Indian lands are not merely "a commod- 
ity or a factor of production"; rather, the land exists "in a relationship with humans."). See also 
Winona LaDuke, Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 COLO. J. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 130, 146 (1994) (stating that "[tlo the extent that indigenous peoples have 
articulated their relationship to the land, they see themselves as belonging to it rather than it to 
them"). 
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tribes as unique cultural and governmental entities. The United States has 
long recognized - though not always fully effectuated - tribal interests in 
self-sufficiency, both in terms of a "right"49 and as an aspect of self-deter- 
mination and ~overeignty.~' To alleviate the barriers to political, economic 
and cultural autonomy posed by colonization, a panoply of federal statutes 
declares the congressional goal of tribal self-deterrninati~n.~' Administra- 
tive regulations and executive orders and memoranda have also embraced 
self-determination as a compelling governmental objective.52 
Secondly, tribal property interests are encompassed within the trust 
obligation. Of course, in western culture, real property is a concept of al- 
most mythical proportion. Yet compelling as the Blackstonian ideal of 
"total dominion" over property is to Anglo-American societies,53 land 
takes on even greater significance to many Indian tribes: it is the "essential 
base of tribal culture, development, and ~ociety."'~ Incontrovertibly, land 
49. Regis-Civetta, supra note 6, at 308 n.35 (citing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,25 
U.S.C. 5 2701(4)-(5) (1994)). See also ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 160 (3d 
ed. 1991) (noting that the federal self-determination policy has encouraged "economic develop- 
ment of Indian lands, particularly the facilitation of leasing of Indian resources"). 
50. See Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Prescott Convention Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1107, 
1115 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The promotion of tribal economic development has long been recognized 
as an important federal interest.") (citing Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 91 F.3d at 
1237 (9th Cir. 1996) (Pregerson, J., dissenting )). See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 n.20 (1987) (stating that the government has an overriding interest in 
helping tribes attain economic self-sufficiency); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 
201 (1985) (recognizing that the tribes' power to obtain revenues is "an essential attribute" of 
self-government); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 (1983) (stating tri- 
bal regulation of wildlife resources on the reservation is essential aspect of Congress' "overarch- 
ing objective" of Indian self-governance and economic development). 
51. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, amended by 
25 U.S.C. $5 450a-450n (1994) (declaring congressional intent to maintain "Federal Govern- 
ment's unique and continuing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people through 
the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly 
transition from Federal domination of programs for and services to Indians" so that Indians may 
effectively and meaningfully participate in the administration of such programs and services); 
Indian Financing Act of 1974, amended by 25 U.S.C. $ 1451 (1994) (declaring congressional policy 
"to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the 
Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own re- 
sources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts compara- 
ble to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities"). 
52. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 253-56. The federal government has promoted a 
policy of American Indian self-determination since 1970. Id. (citing President Nixon's Message 
Transmitting Recommendation for Indian Policy, July 8, 1970, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.  91-363 
(1970)). The policy has been embraced and restated by subsequent administration. See 25 C.F.R. 
§ 151.2 (1995) (BIA has a responsibility to "improve the economic well being of Indian people 
through proper and efficient resource use"); President's Statement on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 99 (1983); President's Memorandum on Government-to-Government Rela- 
tions, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,951. For a comprehensive discussion of the various administrative poli- 
cies issued by executive agencies during the Clinton administration, many of which declare as 
their purpose the promotion of self-determination, see Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 753-60. 
53. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES O N  THE LAW OF ENGLAND 2-11 (1766), in ROB- 
ERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON  PROPER^ LAW 37-38 (2d ed. 1995) ("There is noth- 
ing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right 
of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe."). 
54. Wildman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing COHEN, supra note 
14, at 509). See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pinatas, and 
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is also the most important economic resource of many tribes.s5 As such, 
the United States should act with the jealousy of a fiduciary to protect this 
essential base of tribal economy and self-determinati~n.~~ 
A property owner's right to economic returns from the land has long 
been protected as a fundamental component of the "bundle of sticks" of 
property ~wnership.~'  Beyond this, the economic use of natural resources 
found on Indian lands has been characterized, by both the legislature and 
the judiciary, as a matter of utmost imp~rtance. '~ For example, a tribe's 
sovereign authority to control economic development has been upheld by 
the Supreme Court in cases involving the tribe's power to tax activities 
within its jurisdiction, such as mining,59 and to engage in on-reservation 
gaming enterprises6' 
Moreover, a tribe's ability to use reservation lands for economic devel- 
opment implicates its rights in the reservation itself as a trust resource. The 
trust obligation finds its very source, at least in part, from the massive ces- 
sions of land from the tribes, for which tribes were assured of reserving a 
homeland free from inc~rsion.~ '  Executive agencies should be obligated to 
take action consistent with the fact that tribal development of these re- 
tained lands is critical to economic development and political and cultural 
self-deterrninati~n.~' 
An agency's failure to exercise fiduciary care when taking action that 
impacts the economic capacity of Indian lands, then, constitutes "a serious 
breach" of the trust re~ponsibili ty.~~ Conversely, agency action which bol- 
sters a tribe's sovereignty and economic well-being, particularly that which 
Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W .  V A .  
L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1994) [hereinafter Telescopes] (stating "[w]ithout the land, . . . there is no 
tribe"). 
55. Wildman, 827 F.2d at 1309. 
56. Id. The lands held in trust for tribes are "a unique form of property right in the Ameri- 
can legal system, shaped by the federal trust over tribal land and statutory restraints against 
alienation." Id. 
57. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (regulations which 
deny "all economically beneficial or productive use of land" must be compensated as "takings" 
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). See akio Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.6 
(1978)). 
58. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 216-18; Akins, 130 F.3d at 487-90; United States v. Sho- 
shone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938) (treaty right to "undisturbed use and occupa- 
tion" of land is as sacred as fee simple title, and includes rights to use timber and mineral 
resources); Prieto v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 1187, 1195 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that Interior 
abused its discretion in revoking trust status for Indian land; the United States has a "solemn duty 
'to improve the economic well-being of Indian people through proper and efficient resource 
use."') (citing Coomes v. Adkinson, 414 F. Supp. 975, 986 (D.S.D. 1976)). See also National 
Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. $9 3101, 3104(b)(4) (1994) (encouraging 
tribal involvement in timber management on Indian lands). See generally Indian Self-Determina- 
tion and Education Assistance Act of 1975, amended by 25 U.S.C. $ 450a (1994) (encouraging 
tribal administration of federal service programs). 
59. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). 
60. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 216-18. 
61. For a discussion of the trust obligation, see supra notes 19-22,44 and accompanying text. 
62. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 216-18; Prieto, 655 F. Supp. at 1195; Shoshone, 403 U.S. at 
115-17. See also Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. 5 450f. 
63. See Coomes, 414 F.  Supp. at 992. 
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allows sustained utilization of reservation resources, is generally consistent 
with the United States' trust obligations toward Indian Nations.64 Agen- 
cies must be careful to avoid adverse impacts to tribal resources when im- 
plementing statutes of general application, such as the ESA, and should 
strive to remove impediments to tribal sovereignty and economic develop- 
ment to the greatest extent possible. 
11. THE ESA, ITS HABITAT PROTECTION PROVISIONS, AND 
ITS APPLICATION TO INDIAN LANDS 
Congress enacted the ESA to conserve imperiled wildlife species and 
the ecosystems upon which they depend.65 The ESA, widely known as the 
"pitbull" of environmental laws because of its broad-sweeping application 
and stringent requirements,(j6 prohibits any person from taking a listed spe- 
c i e ~ ~ ~  or adversely modifying occupied or otherwise essential habitat.68 
With respect to federal actions, the ESA also requires consultation to en- 
sure that the action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
any listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
critical habitat.69 
The ESA authorizes the Secretaries of the Departments of Interior 
and of Commerce, through the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), to identify species in need of 
its protections by placing them on the endangered or threatened species 
list.70 Species eligible for listing as endangered are those which are in im- 
minent danger of extinctioq71 while threatened species are those which are 
likely to become endangered within the foreseeable f u t ~ r e . ' ~  
The ESA also charges FWS with designating "critical habitat" for 
64. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 
588 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1978). 
65. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 3 1531(b) (1994). 
66. Adrian N. Hansen, The Endangered Species Act and Extinction of Reserved Indian Wafer 
Rights on the San Juan River, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1995) (citing Robert D. Thornton, 
Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991). See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153,174 (1978) [hereinafter TVA] (stating "Congress intended endangered species to be afforded 
the highest of priorities," over and above the federal agencies' other statutory missions). 
67. The ESA's coverage extends to fish, wildlife and plants. 16 U.S.C. 9 1532(16). The Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for implementing its provisions with respect to wildlife, 
plants and most fish species. 50 C.F.R. 9 402.01(b) (1997). The National Marine Fisheries Ser- 
vice (NMFS) has authority for management of marine life and anadromous fish species, such as 
salmon. Id. See 50 C.F.R. 17(2) (1997). 
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). 
69. 16 U.S.C. 9 1536. 
70. 16 U.S.C. $ 1533(a)(1). For ease of reference, this article generally refers to FWS when 
discussing the obligations of the wildlife agencies. 
71. See 16 U.S.C. 5 1532(6). The statute provides "[tlhe term 'endangered species' means 
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range 
. . . ." Id. 
72. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 9 1532(20) (1994). 
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listed species.73 Critical habitat is defined as: 
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the 
species, at the time it is listed . . . on which are found those physical or 
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and 
(11) which may require special management considerations or protec- 
tion; and 
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the spe- 
cies at the time it is listed . . . upon a determination by the Secretary 
that such areas are essential for conservation of the  specie^.'^ 
The designation of critical habitat follows a statutorily mandated pro- 
cess. FWS must first identify occupied or unoccupied but suitable areas 
which meet the statutory criteria set forth above, based on the best scien- 
tific data a ~ a i l a b l e . ~ ~  Second, FWS is to consider the economic and other 
relevant impacts of designation for each area that fits within the defini- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Finally, after considering economic and other relevant impacts, the 
agency is to determine whether any identified areas should be excluded 
from the final critical habitat designation because the "benefits of such ex- 
clusion outweigh the benefits of [de~ignat ion] ."~~ Areas that meet the stat- 
utory criteria may be excluded from the designation unless exclusion would 
result in extinction of the  specie^.'^ 
Once critical habitat is designated, a listed species enjoys a bipartite 
system of protection. First, Section 9 of the ESA, which is immediately 
triggered by the listing of the species, prevents harm to the species caused 
by either direct action, such as hunting or harassing, or modifications to the 
species' habitat which actually injure the species, even if the habitat has not 
been designated as critical. Section 7(a)(2) provides an additional layer of 
protection for activities with a federal nexus by requiring consultation to 
prevent jeopardy to listed species or destruction or adverse modification of 
critical habitat. Both Section 9 and Section 7 may delay, inhibit or prevent 
73. 16 U.S.C. $ 1533(b)(2). Designation of critical habitat for endangered or threatened spe- 
cies has been characterized as one of the "most costly and controversial classes of administrative 
actions undertaken by the Service in administering the Act." Final Determination of Critical 
Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,129, 39,136 (1997). 
74. 16 U.S.C. 3 1532(5)(A). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (mandating that designation 
should occur concurrently with listing "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable"). A 
recent proposal for amending the ESA, sponsored by Senator Kempthorne, would change the 
timing of the critical habitat designation decision to allow the agency to delay final designation 
for 30 months after listing or until adoption of a recovery plan. S. REP. NO. 105-128, *13, 19 S. 
1180,§ 5(c), (n) (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S9411,9414-15,9416-17 (1997) [hereinafter Kempthorne 
Bill]. 
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
76. Id. In contrast, FWS may not consider economics in the decision to list a species as 
threatened or endangered, but must base that decision solely on the best scientific and commer- 
cial data available. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(l)(A). 
77. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. $1533(b)(2) (1994). 
78. Id. 
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development activities in Indian C o ~ n t r y . ~ ~  
I .  The Prohibition Against "TakeJ' 
Section 9(a) prohibits the unauthorized "take" of a listed species by 
any person.s0 "Take" is defined as to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect . . . ."'I Section 9 does not expressly 
apply to modification or destruction of critical habitat; however, because 
the regulations defining "harm" include the adverse modification or degra- 
dation of any habitat which "actually kills or injures" listed species, altera- 
tion of occupied critical habitat would likely be a prohibited take.x2 
Liability for a take incidental to an otherwise lawful activity, such as agri- 
culture or timber harvest, may be avoided by obtaining an incidental take 
permit pursuant to Section 
2. Section 7 Consultation Provisions as Applied to Critical Habitat 
Section 7 of the ESAa4 requires each federal agency which authorizes, 
funds, or executes any action, including approval of leases and permits, to 
consult with FWS to ensure that the action is not likely to (1) jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered or threatened speciesx5 or (2) 
result in the destruction or adverse modification of a listed species' critical 
habitat.x6 "Destruction or adverse modification" is defined as "a direct or 
indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat 
79. For further discussion see infra, Sections II.C.l and IV.A.3 of this article. As noted 
above, Section 7 applies to federal actions, including lease approvals. The Secretary of the Inte- 
rior, through the BIA, must approve leases on Indian lands. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 9 415; 25 C.F.R. 
9 162.2 (1997). However, development of natural resources by the tribe itself, or an individual 
member, would not necessarily require BIA approval or consultation unless federal funding or 
some other federal nexus, such as a wetlands permit under Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344, were involved. Section 7 does apply to development on Indian lands the majority of the 
time. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1481-83 (citing statistics regarding non-Indian grazing, 
mining and waste disposal in Indian Country). 
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). Violations can result in both civil and criminal penalties. 16 U.S.C. 
$$1540(a), 1540(b). 
81. 16 U.S.C. $ 1532(19). To "take" also includes attempting to engage in such conduct. Id. 
82. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697-700 (upholding Secretary's definition of "take" in 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3, which defines harm as including acts which cause "significant habitat modification or deg- 
radation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral 
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering"); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Lands and Natural 
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that harm includes habitat modifications 
which adversely affect the species). 
83. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (1994). See J.B. Ruhl, Sec- 
tion 7 (a ) ( l )  of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped 
Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 E m .  L. 1107, 1120-21 (1995) [herein- 
after Untapped Power] (noting that Section 10 incidental take statements have been issued 
infrequently). 
84. 16 U.S.C. 1536. 
85. 16 U.S.C. 9 1536(a)(2). "Jeopardy" is defined as action "that reasonably would be ex- 
pected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recov- 
ery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that 
species." 50 C.F.R. $ 402.02 (1997). In comparison, while the take provision prevents activities 
which affect an individual member of a species, the jeopardy provision focuses on the viability of 
populations. 
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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for both the survival and recovery of a listed  specie^."^' The sweep of Sec- 
tion 7's habitat provisions is thus broader than that of Section 9, as Section 
7 reaches actions affecting either occupied or unoccupied critical habitat, 
which, by its very definition, is valuable for survival or recovery of the 
species. 
Prior to undertaking an action or approving a lease or permit, the act- 
ing agency is required to seek notice from FWS whether any listed species 
may be present in the area of the proposed project.88 If, through informal 
consultation, the acting agency determines that the action is not likely to 
adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, the consultation process is 
terminated, and no further action is nece~sary.'~ 
If a species or its habitat may be adversely affected by the action, how- 
ever, the acting agency must engage in formal consultation to determine 
the extent of any effectsg0 To initiate formal consultation, the acting 
agency submits a biological assessment to FWS,91 and provides the "best 
scientific and commercial data available" regarding the effects that an ac- 
tion may have upon listed species or critical habitat.92 FWS then issues a 
biological opinion ("BO") detailing how the proposed agency action affects 
species or their critical habitat.93 The BO may suggest reasonable and pru- 
dent alternatives which could be taken to avoid adverse effects in imple- 
menting the action.94 In addition, in the event that the taking of an 
endangered or threatened species incidental to the proposed action is likely 
to occur, but it will not jeopardize the species, FWS may issue an incidental 
take statement allowing the action to proceed.95 If the BO concludes that 
no reasonable and prudent alternative will avoid jeopardy to the species or 
destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat, the action may not 
87. 50 C.F.R. 5 402.02. 
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 765 (9th Cir. 1985) (en- 
joining development of Jersey Jack timber road because, although Forest Service was aware of 
presence of endangered gray wolf, it failed to provide formal notice to FWS and failed to prepare 
a biological assessment). 
89. SO C.F.R. 3 402.13 (1997). See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(k)(l) (1997); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b)(l) 
(1997) ("A Federal agency need not initiate formal consultation if, as a result of the preparation 
of a biological assessment . . . or as a result of informal consultation . . ., the Federal agency 
determines, with the written concurrence of the Director, that the proposed action is not likely to 
adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat."). 
90. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). 
91. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(~)(6). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (describing requirements for biolog- 
ical assessments). 
92. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(d). Formal consultation is to conclude within 90 days after its initia- 
tion. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(l)(A). It may, however, be extended for up to 60 days without the 
consent of the applicant, and longer if the applicant agrees. 50 C.F.R. 5 402.14(e). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h). The Service is required to provide its bio- 
logical opinion to the Federal agency and any applicant within 45 days of the conclusion of con- 
sultation, but this time period may be suspended upon agreement of the applicant. SO C.F.R. 
§ 402.14(e), ( f ) .  
94. 16 U.S.C. 3 1536(b)(3)(A). 
95. 16 U.S.C. 3 1536(b)(4). See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1997). See also Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 
F.3d 434,440-46 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining statutory requirements and upholding Section 7 inci- 
dental take statement for the Columbia River Fish Management Plan); Untapped Power, supra 
note 83, at 1120-21 (describing and comparing incidental take provisions of Sections 7 and 10). 
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C. THE ESA's APPLICATION TO INDIAN LANDS AND RESOURCES 
The trust relationship encompasses a two-fold obligation with respect 
to wildlife and its habitat. Fiduciary duties extend not only to the environ- 
mental integrity of the reservation land base and to wildlife resources, on- 
and off-re~ervation,~' but also to tribal sovereignty and utilization of reser- 
vation resources to promote the economic well-being of Indian  nation^.^' 
These dual responsibilities are sometimes difficult to harmonize. 
The ESA implicates both aspects of the trust obligation. Sections 7 
and 9, which are designed to preserve listed species, may protect tribal 
wildlife resources, but, at the same time, these two provisions can curtail or 
prevent the use of listed species and its habitat. Meanwhile, the critical 
habitat requirements of the ESA, which are also aimed at promoting the 
conservation of listed species, have significant effects on the use and enjoy- 
ment of Indian lands and resources while providing only minimal protec- 
tion for the integrity of either the reservation environment or the species 
itself. 
1. The ESA's Implications for Reservation Resources 
It is not at all unusual for tribal economic development plans to be 
frustrated by the constraints of the ESA.99 The ESA's critical habitat pro- 
visions bring the statute's potential conflict with tribal interests into sharp 
focus. The most obvious result of designation is the delay, curtailment or 
prohibition of development activities under Section 7's consultation and 
jeopardy  provision^.'^^ 
But there are more subtle impacts that can be equally detrimental to 
96. 16 U.S.C. $ 1536(a)(2). See W A ,  437 U.S. at 184 (applying Act to Tellico Dam). The 
statute provides an exception for activities which are granted an exemption by the Endangered 
Species Committee, commonly known as the "God Squad." 16 U.S.C. $ 1536(e), (h). This provi- 
sion has been invoked infrequently, see Gail L. Achterman, Reflections on Owls, Salmon and 
Suckers: Current Developments under the Endangered Species Act, 38 ROCKY MNT. MIN. L. INST. 
5-1,5-23 (1992). Furthermore, exemptions are rarely granted. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, 
ET AL, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 806 (3d ed. 1993). 
97. See Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilareralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relation- 
ship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1066-75 
(1997) [hereinafter Bilateralism] (citing Memorandum Summarizing Tribal Workshop on the En- 
dangered Species Act 2 (Feb. 20,1996)); Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 795 (recognizing trust 
duty to protect "Federal lands and habitats which support the resources upon which meaningful 
exercise of tribal hunting and fishing rights depend, and [administer] Federal projects in a manner 
which prevents the diminishment of associated fish and wildlife resources, and the tribal share in 
them") (citing Memorandum from Ada Deer, Ass't Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of 
Interior, to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks 4 (June 23, 1994)). 
98. For further discussion, see supra Section I.B.2 of this article. 
99. See WA, 437 U.S. at 153. Even if no jeopardy is ultimately found, projects can be 
delayed for at least 180 days while a biological assessment is prepared and, if formal consultation 
is required, for an additional 90 days or more. See 16 U.S.C. 5 1536(b)(l)(A), (c)(l); 50 C.F.R. 
9 402.14(d)-(e). 
100. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 240. For a discussion of designations' impacts on tribal 
economic activities resulting from the Mexican Spotted Owl and San Juan River fish species 
designations, see Section IV.A.3, infra. 
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trust resources. Designation can adversely affect other aspects of the phys- 
ical environment, and even, at times, the targeted species itself. Designa- 
tion can preclude preventative management measures, such as flood 
control and silvicultural treatment for fire, disease and insect infestation, 
which, in turn, may result in harm to non-targeted wildlife and fish spe- 
c ie~. '~ '  In addition, designation sometimes imperils the very species it is 
intended to protect by alerting a landowner to its presence.lo2 
In fact, FWS itself has determined that the designation of critical 
habitat "provides little or no conservation benefit despite the great cost to 
put it in place."lo3 FWS has stated: 
Over 20 years of experience in designating critical habitat and 
applying it as a tool in conserving species leads the Service to seri- 
ously question its utility and the value it provides in comparison to 
the monetary, administrative, and other resources it absorbs . . . 
[Tlhe Service believes that critical habitat is not an ejjicient o r  ef- 
fective means of securing the conservation of species.'04 
FWS7s actions speak as loudly as its words when it comes to critical habitat 
- in the face of budget shortfalls, FWS has given the designation of critical 
habitat the lowest priority among the Service's various listing activities.10s 
The actual listing of the species itself, with its attendant prohibitions on 
species jeopardy and on takes, including habitat modifications which di- 
rectly harm a species, provides far greater protection than critical habitat 
designation.lo6 In addition, there are other, more effective tools available 
under the ESA, including recovery plans, land exchanges and habitat con- 
servation plans.lo7 Yet, in spite of the de minimis conservation benefit and 
the detrimental impact on tribal sovereignty, property interests and eco- 
nomic development, Indian lands continue to be included in critical habitat 
 designation^.'^^ 
101. See Catron County v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the impact of designation, which would preclude flood control efforts, 
would be "immediate and . . . disastrous"); Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, 41 26-27, 29 
(alleging that designation could curtail fire management efforts and impair "wildlife habitat crea- 
tion activities"). Bur see Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 
S.Ct. 698 (1996) (holding that NEPA analysis was not required for a designation decision, in part 
because it was an "environmentally beneficial" action). 
102. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995), mod'd on other grounds, 
967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (upholding FWS's refusal to designate critical habitat for grizzly 
bear on grounds that designation could lead to a backlash and jeopardize bear recovery). 
103. 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,130. 
104. Id. at 39,131 (emphasis added). 
105. Id. at 39,130 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 64,475 (1996)). 
106. Id. at 39,131-32. FWS does note that designation "may provide some benefits to a species 
by identifying areas important to the species' conservation, particularly until a recovery plan is 
adopted, including habitat that is not presently occupied and that may require restoration efforts 
to support recovery." Id. at 39,132. I t  concludes, however, that these benefits are minor. Id. 
107. See id. at 39,130-32. See also Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994) 
(recovery plans); 16 U.S.C. $ 1539(a)(2) (habitat conservation plans); 16 U.S.C. 5 1534 (land ac- 
quisition and exchange). 
108. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135 (including Indian lands in Southwest Willow Flycatcher 
designation). 
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2. The ESA Does Not Abrogate Indian Treaty Rights 
In spite of its breadth and the stringency of its provisions, the ESA 
does not take precedence over solemn obligations embodied in treaties 
with Indian Nations, nor does it excuse federal agencies from fulfilling their 
trust responsibilities. Although statutes of general application, such as the 
ESA and many environmental laws, apply to Indians in Indian Country 
when their purpose requires "national or uniform app l i ca t i~n , " '~~  tribal ac- 
tivities will be excluded from the law if its application would de facto abro- 
gate treaty rights.ll0 There is a strong presumption against implied 
abrogation. A federal statute will not be construed to abrogate Indian 
treaty rights unless there is clear evidence that Congress was actually aware 
of the treaty rights and consciously chose to abrogate them.l1'. 
Courts look first to the face of the statute for an express statement of 
congressional intent to abrogate.''' If there is no such statement, "compel- 
ling" evidence in the legislative history may suffice: 
We have required that Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty 
rights be clear and plain . . . . Absent explicit statutory language, we 
have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of 
treaty rights . . . . We do not construe statutes as abrogating treaty 
rights in a backhanded way. . . Indian treaty rights are too fundamen- 
tal to be easily cast aside.l13 
In spite of the ESA's seemingly unambiguous and unequivocal appli- 
cation to "any person,"l14 there is no explicit provision on the face of the 
ESA which evidences a congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty 
109. Federal Power Comm'n, 362 U.S. at 118-20 (Federal Power Act applies to Indian lands 
due to comprehensive purpose of Act). 
110. Id. The prohibition against de facto abrogation is one of three exceptions to the principle 
that laws of general application apply to tribes. In addition, general laws will not apply to tribes if 
they impact essential tribal affairs. One court noted, "Indian tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction 
over essential matters of reservation government, in the absence of specific Congressional limita- 
tion." United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981) 
(citing Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
1003 (1970)). See also United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (domestic relations); Jones v. 
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (inheritance rules); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,55-56 
(1978) (tribal membership). Finally, general laws do not apply to tribes if it can be shown that 
Congress intended the law not to apply to Indians on their reservations. Farris, 624 F.2d at 894. 
111. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) [hereinafter Dion I]. The presumption 
applies when generally applicable legislation infringes on specifically granted treaty rights, such 
as rights to hunt and fish on usual and accustomed grounds, and rights to undisturbed or exclusive 
use of Indian lands. See Farris, 624 F.2d at 893 (general treaty language such as that devoting 
land to a tribe's "exclusive use" does not preclude federal regulation of gaming, although it does 
"suffice to oust state jurisdiction"). 
112. Dion I, 476 U.S. at 739. 
113. Id. at 739-40 (emphasis added) (citing Washington v. Washington Commercial Fishing 
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessef Ass'n]; Menominee Tribe v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968)). See Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d at 1006 (Flood Control 
Act of 1944, providing for development of the Missouri River basin, did not authorize the Corps 
of Engineers to unilaterally abrogate a treaty by taking tribal treaty lands by eminent domain). 
To find abrogation there must be "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict 
on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by 
abrogating the treaty." Dion I, 476 U.S. at 739-40. See generally COHEN, supra note 14, at 221-25. 
114. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994). "Person" is defined 
broadly to include federal, state and foreign governments and any "entity subject to the jurisdic- 
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 right^."^ Neither the Supreme Court nor any Circuit Court of Appeals has 
definitively ruled that the ESA's restrictions apply to Indian tribes engag- 
ing in activities protected by treaties. In fact, the only Circuit Court to 
squarely address the issue held, in United States v. Dion,l16 that the ESA 
does not abrogate treaty rights. On appeal, the Supreme Court found it 
unnecessary to reach the ESA issue, because it determined that the Bald 
Eagle Protection Act1" abrogated existing treaty rights to hunt or take 
protected eaglesu8 The Court found that a specific section of that Act, 
which provided that the Secretary of the Interior may allow Indians to take 
eagles by permit for religious purposes, set forth clear evidence of Con- 
gress' intent that unpermitted, unauthorized takings would not be allowed, 
treaty rights notwithstanding.ll9 
By contrast, the sole reference to American Indian interests in the 
ESA is a single subsection which provides an exemption from the takings 
prohibition for Native Alaskans and non-native permanent residents of 
Alaska Native villages if the taking is "primarily for subsistence pur- 
p o s e ~ . " ' ~ ~  This provision sheds no light on the abrogation inquiry because 
the legal framework applicable to Native Alaskan rights and relationship 
with the United States is markedly different than that of the tribes in the 
contiguous United States. Native Alaskans have not entered into treaties 
with the United States government, given Alaska's unique history and re- 
rnotene~s.'~' Indeed, one of the few courts to address the issue found that 
"[tlo treat the consideration of indigenous Alaskans' rights as the consider- 
ation of Native American treaty rights nationwide, for the simple reason 
that both groups are regarded as Indians, is d i s i n g e n u ~ u s . " ~ ~ ~  
tion of the United States." 16 U.S.C. $ 1532(13). The statutory definition does not, however, 
expressly include American Indians or Indian tribes. 
115. See Sally J. Johnson, Honoring Treaty Rights and Conserving Endangered Species after 
United States v. Dion, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 179 (1992); Robert J. Miller, Comment, Speaking 
with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 
543 (1991) (discussing ESA's application to hunting and fishing rights protected by treaty). 
116. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) [hereinafter Dion 
11] (holding that the ESA did not abrogate Dion's treaty right to hunt on the Yankton Sioux 
Indian Reservation), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
117. 16 U.S.C. $9 1531-44. 
118. Dion I, 476 U.S. at 745. Because the Eagle Protection Act abrogated Dion's right to hunt 
eagles, the Court found that the treaty provided no defense to the ESA prosecution. Id. 
119. Id. at 740 (citing 16 U.S.C. $ 668a (1985)). See 50 C.F.R. $ 22.22 (regulations governing 
permits). 
120. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 5 1539(e) (1994). 
121. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 911-17 (discussing Alaska Native possession, set- 
tlement by non-natives and Alaska's entry into the Union in 1958, and the enactment of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. $5 1601-28 (1986), under which claims to aborig- 
inal title were extinguished in exchange for land selection rights). 
122. United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 663 (D. Minn. 1991). Contrary to Bresette, 
one earlier district court opinion held that the ESA does abrogate tribal treaty rights to take 
protected species, relying on the Alaska native exception and the broad scope of the statutory 
definition of "person." See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (upholding 
conviction for taking endangered Florida panther). Neither of these provisions, singularly or 
together, meet Dion's stringent requirements for an unambiguous expression of intent to abro- 
gate on the face of the statute or "compelling" evidence of such intent in the legislative history. 
In fact, the Bresette court flatly rejected Billie's conclusion, finding that the Florida court's rea- 
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Just as there is no language of abrogation on the face of the ESA itself, 
the ESA's legislative history contains no evidence, much less "clear and 
plain" evidence, that Congress actually considered Indian treaty rights and 
chose to abrogate them.123 Accordingly, under the rubric of Dion, the 
ESA should not be construed as abrogating tribal rights to utilize Indian 
lands and resources.124 
3. The Conservation Principles 
Even though the ESA does not abrogate treaty rights, arguably, re- 
strictions may be placed on tribal activities under the statute if necessary 
for conservation of a species. The conservation exception, which was first 
enunciated in Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wa~hington, '~~ is typi- 
cally applied to a state's regulation of Indian hunting and fishing rights held 
"in common" with other citizens.126 The conservation standard allows state 
regulation of tribal fish and game resources if the restriction is: (1) reason- 
able and necessary for species preservation; (2) the least restrictive alterna- 
tive; (3) non-discriminatory, both facially and as applied; and (4) the tribe's 
soning was simply unpersuasive. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 663. See also Miller, supra note 115, at 
569 (arguing that the Billie court improperly "discarded the Dion test in favor of a more liberal 
test built on a series of inferences"). 
123. See Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 663. See also Johnson, supra note 115, at 187-88 (discussing 
legislative history of ESA and Congress' subsequent failure to amend the statute to address In- 
dian treaty rights, and concluding that Congress did not intend to abrogate). Congress did, how- 
ever, reject a subsistence exception as well as a blanket exemption for "American Indians, 
Aleuts, and Eskimos" during its deliberations on the ESA. See H.R. 13081 9 5(a)(2), 92d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1972); S. 3199, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 1461, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). That 
American Indians were considered in tandem with Native Alaskans only reinforces the argument 
that Congress failed to consider treaty rights. See 11.121, supra, and text. 
124. See Dion 11,752 F.2d at 1270. See akio Miller, supra note 115, at 567; Johnson, supra note 
115, at 188. For contrasting views, see Regis-Civetta, supra note 6, at 344-45, and a pre-Dion 
Department of Interior opinion entitled Application of The Endangered Species Act to Native 
Americans with Treaty Himting and Fishing Rights, 87 Int. Dec. 525 (Nov. 4, 1980). Professor 
Coggins, in one of the earliest articles to address the application of the ESA and other federal 
wildlife statutes to treaty tribes, argues that the ESA modifies treaty-based activities, particularly 
hunting or otherwise directly taking listed species. George Cameron Coggins & William 
Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 STANFORD L. REV. 375 (1978). 
Coggins' pre-Dion analysis is based on the Alaska Native exemption and its legislative history 
and the intended breadth and comprehensive nature of the statute. Id. at 404-05. Although the 
Supreme Court's subsequent guidance on implied abrogation could quite possibly alter this as- 
sessment - neither the Alaska exemption nor the scope of the statute rise to the level of clear 
and plain evidence of a congressional intent to displace treaty rights - Coggins' ultimate recom- 
mendation is still sound. He proposes that conservation objectives for imperiled species can be 
harmonized with treaty rights in a manner not dissimilar to that advanced by the Secretarial 
Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species. If direct conflict is inevi- 
table, for example, where a treaty guarantees a right to hunt or fish a severely depleted listed 
species, action could be taken to preserve the species, but treaty Indians must be given priority in 
the allocation or regulation of the species. Id. at 415, 421-23. 
125. 391 U.S. 392 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup I]. 
126. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 658; Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392; Dep't of Game of Wash- 
ington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) [hereinafter Puyallup 111. See also Clinton Critique, 
supra note 21, at 778-79; Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 664. The Puyallup cases addressed a continuing 
dispute between Pacific Northwest tribes and the State of Washington over treaty fishing rights to 
anadromous fish species. In Puyallup 11, Justice Douglas, upholding Indian rights to commercial 
net fishing, stated that the State's police power "is adequate to prevent the steelhead from follow- 
ing the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians the federal right to 
pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets." Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. at 49. 
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own conservation measures do not achieve the conservation purpose.12' A 
fifth conservation principle has been embraced at various times and with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm by the Department of the Interior under the 
Clinton Administration, but has not gained wide judicial recognition: re- 
strictions of tribal activities may be imposed only if regulation of non-In- 
dian activities do not accomplish conse r~a t ion . '~~  
The issues raised by state fish and game codes and the ESA's restric- 
tions on takings and jeopardy are at least somewhat analogous, in that both 
strive to conserve wildlife resources.129 The conservation exception, devel- 
oped to place parameters on state efforts to regulate tribal activities, may 
therefore be useful in examining whether federal restrictions on tribal ac- 
tivities are a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ' ~ ~  Yet the conservation principles alone, even if 
127. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (D. Wash. 1974), affd,  520 F.2d 676 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). See also United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 
277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that "only upon a finding of necessity, irreparable harm and the 
absence of effective Indian tribal self-regulation" may the State regulate gill-net fishing in the 
Great Lakes). 
128. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 793. The fifth principle, which entails an equitable 
distribution of economic and environmental benefits and burdens, is adopted as a matter of policy 
in the Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species, see 
discussion, infra at Section III(B)-(C), but research reveals no judicial precedent explicitly requir- 
ing that this fifth principle be fulfilled before regulations may be imposed on tribes. Arguably, 
however, a failure to regulate non-Indian activities before restricting Indian activities would of- 
fend the third principle - regulations must be non-discriminatory. 
129. State regulation of wildlife resources does not stem from title to the wildlife, but instead 
from the state's police powers. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (dismissing state's 
justification for regulation of wildlife resources within its borders under the theory of ownership 
of the resource as mere fiction; instead, wildlife is held in a trust capacity for the benefit of all 
citizens). The "public trust" doctrine may also justify state intervention in wildlife management. 
See id.; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. .L. REV. 471, 475, 478 (1970) [hereinafter Doctrine]; Joseph L. Sax, The 
Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J .  LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93,104 (1990) [hereinafter Rights]; 
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and 
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENWL. L. 425,426 n.6, 464 (1989) [hereinafter Headwaters] 
(noting that the public trust duty for navigable water bodies extends to fisheries). While the 
federal government has public trust responsibilities as well, the federal government generally 
asserts authority over imperiled wildlife species under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995, 
999 (D. Hawaii 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (ESA's prohibition on habitat destruc- 
tion upheld under Treaty and Commerce Clauses; court noted in dicta that federal property inter- 
ests might also justify restrictions for the benefit of wildlife); Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 
620,624-27 (9th Cir. 1938). See generally George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife and the Constitution: 
The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55 WASH. L. REV. 295 (1980). 
130. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1071-72. During the Clinton Administration, several 
federal agencies have indicated their acceptance of the conservation principles to govern their 
own conduct. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Framework for Treaty Tribe Harvest of 
Pacific Groundfish and 1996 Makah Whiting Allocation, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,786, 28,791-92 (1996) 
(following principles pursuant to Judge Rothstein's order in Makah Indian Tribe v. Brown, No. 
(35-1606R, Civil No. 9213-Phase I, Subproceeding No. 92-1, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 
1993) ([the] Secretary must accord treaty fishers the opportunity to take 50% of the harvestable 
surplus of halibut in their usual and accustomed grounds, and the harvestable surplus must be 
determined according to the conservation necessity principles."); U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Forest Service and U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, Record of 
Decision for Amendments to Land Management Planning Documents Within the Range of the 
Northern Spotted Owl 54-55 (Apr. 13,1994) (copy on file with author) (adopting all five conser- 
vation principles for actions on federal public lands that impact treaty resources). See also Cog- 
gins & Modrcin, supra note 129, at 415, 419-23 (arguing that federal conservation requirements, 
such as those imposed by the ESA, should be interpreted as modifying treaty rights). 
404 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
the fifth principle were also required, may not fully reflect the federal trust 
responsibility to tribes - a responsibility which has no state counterpart. 
If the trust obligation were to be defined by the conservation principles, 
which are used in determining when treaty resources may be regulated, not 
to review whether a breach of trust has occurred, an affirmative federal 
obligation could be transmuted "into the lowest echelon of permissible fed- 
eral c~nduct."'~' In other words, the trust responsibility is not met simply 
by ensuring that treaty rights are not abrogated by federal regulation. 
More specifically, the conservation principles, developed to govern the 
harvest of fish and game, do not necessarily justify the designation of criti- 
cal habitat and curtailment of tribal development activities in Indian Coun- 
try for two reasons. First, the conservation principles are generally applied 
to Indian activities which affect resources held "in common" with other 
citizens.132 While usufructuary rights to wildlife resources may be held in 
common with others, the reservation land itself - which necessarily in- 
cludes wildlife habitat - is held in trust for the exclusive and undisturbed 
use of the tribes. 
Secondly, regulation of Indian development is not acceptable, as a 
matter of distributive justice,133 unless the conservation burden is equitably 
distributed. The conservation burden has not been evenly distributed when 
it comes to the designation of critical habitat in Indian Country. In fact, 
while non-Indian industry has enjoyed the economic benefits of decades of 
extractive enterprises, degrading habitat which may have otherwise been 
suitable for ESA designation, tribal enterprises have only recently become 
positioned to take advantage of natural resources on Indian lands. Mean- 
while, because Indian lands are generally less developed than surrounding 
areas, they have become enclaves of wildlife habitat which feel the brunt of 
the ESA's conservation restrictions more heavily than non-Indian lands 
and activities.134 
131. Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 794. Treaties represent the "outer bounds of permissi- 
ble agency regulation" while the trust responsibility goes further, providing an affirmative duty to 
protect tribal resources. Id. For an argument that a federal agency's application of the conserva- 
tion principles in the ESA context to qualify Indian hunting and fishing rights would result in de 
facto abrogation and "undermine the firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-government," 
see Johnson, supra note 115, at 191-92. 
132. See Bresette, 761 F .  Supp. at 664 (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398); Washington, 384 F. 
Supp. at 333,342-43 (holding that treaty tribes had an unrestricted right to fish on-reservation but 
that off-reservation activities could be regulated by the state, absent adequate tribal regulation, if 
necessary for conservation). See also Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 
165 (1977) [hereinafter Puyallup 1111 (applying the conservation principles to tribe's exclusive on- 
reservation fishing rights). In dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the effect of this holding 
must be limited to the unique facts of the case, involving more than fourteen years of litigation 
over migratory fish runs and the discovery, late in the litigation, that the reservation had not in 
fact been extinguished, as formerly believed. Id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
133. Distributive justice promotes the equitable distribution of economic and environmental 
benefits and burdens through the law. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 241 11.82. 
134. For a discussion providing more detail and including specific examples, see infra, Section 
IV.A.3. See also Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 770. Wood borrowed the words of Jerry 
Meninock, a member of the Yakima Tribal Council, to describe non-Indians' concept of conserva- 
tion: "the white man's progress had diminished the fish runs, and therefore, the Indians had to 
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Accordingly, the conservation standards should be used as guiding 
principles for federal designation and management of critical habitat only if 
steps are taken to redistribute the conservation burden in a manner which 
prioritizes tribal trust resources above other general statutory require- 
ments. If the standards, including the equitable distribution principle, are 
employed in tandem with procedural safeguards which ensure meaningful 
government-to-government consultation, both the wildlife resource and the 
reservation resource will benefit. 
111. THE SECRETARIAL ORDER 
The Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and En- 
dangered Species ("Order") was issued by the Departments of Commerce 
and Interior on June 5 ,  1997, as the culmination of months of negotiations 
between high-level agency officials and tribal representatives, and over a 
year of work on the part of tribal representatives and  organization^.'^^ Its 
overarching theme is to "harmonize" the federal trust responsibility to 
tribes and the statutory missions of the Departments in implementing the 
ESA.'36 The Order attempts to effectuate the general policy that the De- 
partments and their agencies carry out their responsibilities "in a manner 
that . . . strives to ensure that Indian tribes do not bear a disproportionate 
burden for the conservation of listed species, so as to avoid or minimize 
the potential for conflict and confrontation."13' 
Notably, a tribal initiative provided the impetus for the Order - un- 
like most federal Indian policies, the Order was not generated by central- 
ized federal decision making and handed down to the tribes.138 Tribes 
stop fishing to protect what was left." Id. (citing Hearings before the Columbia River Fisheries 
Task Force (Oct. 28, 1992)). 
135. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1066-75 (describing the efforts of inter-tribal work- 
shops and working groups to develop a position paper on ESA issues to be presented to Secretary 
of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt). See also Government Defers to Tribes Under Endangered Species, 
OJIBWE NEWS, June 13, 1997, at 2. 
136. Secretarial Order § 1; Appendix § 2(A)(2). 
137. Secretarial Order § 1. Similarly, Appendix § 3(B)(5) provides that, when exercising au- 
thority for threatened species under ESA 4(d), the agencies shall "avoid or minimize effects on 
tribal management or economic development . . . to the maximum extent allowed by law." Id. 
138. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1063. Professor Wilkinson noted that, procedurally, the 
Order "serves as one major example of how the government-to-government relationship between 
the United States and Indian tribes can be successfully implemented." Id. The Order is unique 
among executive-branch orders on Indian affairs, not only because its impetus came from Indian 
Country but also because (1) it resulted from negotiations between high-level representatives 
from the federal team and Indian Country, with the aid of technical advisors, (2) bilateral proto- 
cols for the negotiations were adopted at the outset, and (3) adequate time was set aside for 
participants to understand the relevant cultural, historical and legal background. Id. at 1077-78. 
Professor Wilkinson described the importance of this process: 
The detailed education about tribal issues allowed the federal negotiators, 
most of whom had previously spent little time on Indian matters, to understand 
the true distinctiveness of Indian policy: the depth of commitment of Indian peo- 
ple to preserve and protect tribal sovereignty, their homelands, the trust relation- 
ship, and Indian culture. With that in mind, the federal negotiators were able to , 
see the tribal positions with new eyes. 
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came together to propose ESA policy as a result of numerous concerns. 
Time was of the essence, because proposals to amend the ESA were pend- 
ing in Congress, and reauthorization seemed imminent.139 If the tribes 
failed to  assert a position, other interests, including environmentalists, in- 
dustry, and the states, would likely adopt and advocate their own contra- 
dictory positions on reauthorization without tribal input.140 Further, 
enforcement of the ESA's requirements in Indian Country had resulted in 
increasingly troubling conflicts with hunting and fishing treaty rights, reli- 
gious activities and economic development of Indian lands.14' In addition, 
tribal sovereignty and self-determination were being undermined by the 
application of the ESA's restrictions to tribal activities and lands.142 Fi- 
nally, the ESA's pressures to manage lands for a single species were viewed 
as conflicting with tribal policies of holistic, integrated resource manage- 
ment.143 The Order was crafted to address these concerns. 
Pervasive throughout the Order's provisions is the acknowledgment 
that tribal governments are sovereigns over Indian lands,144 and that, with 
respect to federal decisions which may affect tribal resources, consultation 
with tribes on a government-to-government basis is a critical component of 
the trust re1at ion~hip. l~~ The Order directs the Departments to comply 
with the following principles in an effort to fulfill the sovereignty objective: 
(1) work directly with tribes on a government-to-government basis to pro- 
mote healthy ecosystems; (2) recognize that Indian lands are not subject to 
the same controls as federal public lands; (3) assist tribes in developing and 
expanding tribal programs to promote healthy ecosystems without the need 
Id. at 1079. 
139. See id. at 1065 n.6 (citing Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of 
1995, H.R. 2275,104th Cong. (1995)). The ESA was to be reauthorized in 1992, but reauthoriza- 
tion has yet to occur. Although H.R. 2275 did not pass, proposals to amend the ESA continue to 
draw the attention of Congress. See Kempthorne Bill, supra note 74. Concerns regarding eco- 
nomics and impacts to private property rights seem to be the driving force behind most of the 
proposals. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 265 and n.235; Erin Kelly, Congress to Debate Major 
Environmental Measures Next Year, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, NOV. 9,1997, at A9. See also Untapped 
Power, supra note 83, at  1137 (noting that the ESA has been the "whipping boy of property rights 
advocates"). 
140. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1066. 
141. See id. at 1065 (noting that "[a]lthough the environmental impacts had been created by 
non-Indian development, the tribes were facing considerable pressure from ESA enforcement 
over matters such as timber harvesting, building construction, water development, and salmon 
harvesting."). See also Tsosie, supra note 46, at 240. 
142. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 232, 240-41. 
143. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1068-69. See also Tsosie, supra note 46, at 274-76, 286- 
87. 
- .   
144. See, e.g., Secretarial Order 5 5, princ. 1 ("Departments . . . shall view tribal governments 
as sovereign entities with authority and responsibility for the health and welfare of ecosystems on 
Indian lands"). 
145. See, e.g., Secretarial Order 5 4, 5 5, princ. 1 and 3; Appendix 5 3. At  the signing cere- 
mony, Secretary Babbitt stated: "For too long we have failed to recognize the needs of Indian 
tribes to be consulted and part of the process from the beginning, and the traditional knowledge 
they can share about species, habitat and conservation." Government Defers to Tribes Under 
Endangered Species, supra note 135, at 2. 
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for conservation restrictions; (4) consider impacts on Indian use of listed 
species for cultural and religious purposes; and, finally, ( 5 )  make informa- 
tion available and facilitate the exchange of information related to tribal 
trust resources and Indian lands by protecting tribal information from 
d i s c l ~ s u r e . ' ~ ~  
The Order is accompanied by an Appendix which provides more de- 
tailed guidance for the agencies' implementation of the Order.14' Its stated 
purpose is to provide policy to the Services7 national, regional and field 
offices regarding the on-the-ground implementation of the Order.148 The 
Appendix is to be "considered an integral part" of the Order.149 
The Order itself makes only one explicit reference to critical habitat: 
"[nlothing in this Order shall be applied to authorize [directed] take of 
listed species, or any activity that would jeopardize the continued existence 
of any listed species or destroy or adversely modify designated critical 
habitat."150 The Appendix, however, provides the procedural safeguards 
of early notification,15' information exchange152 and meaningful tribal par- 
ticipation during the designation process.153 Substantively, the Appendix 
prioritizes tribal interests by stating: 
[i]n keeping with the trust responsibility, [the agencies] shall consult 
with the affected Indian tribe(s) when considering the designation of 
critical habitat in an area that may impact tribal trust resources, tri- 
p - - - - - - - 
146. Secretarial Order 5 5, princ. 1-5. The Order recognizes that information provided by 
Indian Nations during the consultation process may be confidential, and strives to keep it that 
way. This was articulated by the following: "[iln the course of the mutual exchange of i~forma-  
tion, the Departments shall protect, to the maximum extent practicable, tribal information which 
has been disclosed to or collected by the Departments." Id. 5 5, princ. 5. 
147. Appendix § 1. 
148. Id. The Departments have been directed to begin a training program for employees re- 
garding implementation of the Order pursuant to the Appendix. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, 
at 1083. 
149. Appendix 1. 
150. Secretarial Order 9 2(D). 
151. See Appendix 5 3(B)(2). The Appendix states: the agencies shall coordinate and "en- 
courage meaningful tribal participation" and "[rlecognize the right of Indian tribes to participate 
fully. . . by providing timely notification to, soliciting information and comments from, and utiliz- 
ing the expertise of, Indian tribes whose exercise of tribal rights or tribal trust resources could be 
affected . . . [by a decision to propose or issue final rules] (ii) to designate critical habitat . . . ." Id. 
152. See Appendix $ 3(B)(3). The Appendix provides that agencies shall: "[r]ecognize the 
contribution to be made by affected tribes, throughout the process and prior to finalization and 
close of the public comment period, in the review of proposals to designate critical habitat and 
evaluate economic impacts of such proposals with implications for tribal trust resources or the 
exercise of tribal rights" and shall notify tribes and the BIA and solicit information on "tribal 
cultural values, reserved hunting, fishing, gathering, and other Indian rights or tribal economic 
development for use in the preparation of (i) economic analyses involving impacts on tribal com- 
munities; and (ii) the preparation of 'balancing tests' to determine appropriate exclusions from 
critical habitat . . . ." See also Appendix $ 3(C)(1), (D)(l). The Appendix further provides that 
agencies shall: "[flacilitate the Services' use of the best available scientific and commercial data 
by soliciting information, traditional knowledge, and comments from, and utilizing the expertise 
of, affected Indian tribes. . ." in the Section 7 consultation and habitat conservation planning 
processes. Id. 
153. See Appendix 3(B)(4). FWS and NMFS, "[iln keeping with the trust responsibility, 
shall consult with the affected Indian tribe(s) when considering the designation of critical habitat 
in an area that may impact tribal trust resources, tribally-owned fee lands, or the exercise of tribal 
rights." Id. See also Appendix § 3(B)(2). 
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bally-owned fee lands, or the exercise of tribal rights. Critical habitat 
shall not be designated in such areas unless it is determined essential to  
conserve a listed species. In designating critical habitat, the Services 
shall evaluate and document the extent to which the conservation 
needs of the listed species can be achieved by limiting the designation 
to other lands.lS4 
With respect to  habitat modifications which could result in incidental 
takings, the Order adopts the conservation principles, along with the stan- 
dard requiring equitable distribution of burdens, by directing the agencies 
to give notice that: 
(i) the restriction is reasonable and necessary for conservation of the 
species at issue; (ii) the conservation purpose of the restriction cannot 
be achieved by reasonable regulation of non-Indian activities; (iii) the 
measure is the least restrictive alternative available to achieve the re- 
quired conservation purpose; (iv) the restriction does not discrimi- 
nate against Indian activities, either as stated or applied; and, (v) 
voluntary tribal measures are not adequate to achieve the necessary 
conservation purpose.'55 
The agencies are to provide assistance for the development of tribal 
conservation plans,156 and, when such plans are in place, they should be 
given deference.lS7 In addition, the Appendix advances the Clinton Ad- 
ministration's policy of promoting cooperative conservation tools, such as 
habitat conservation plans,15* by encouraging the use of intergovernmental 
154. Appendix § 3(B)(4) (emphasis added). 
155. Secretarial Order 5 5, princ. 3(C) (emphasis added). In comparison, if a tribal activity 
which could result in a direct take would be restricted, "meaningful government-to-government 
consultation shall occur, in order to strive to harmonize the federal trust responsibility to the 
tribes, tribal sovereignty and the statutory missions of the Departments." Id. In either case, if 
the Departments "determine that conservation restrictions are necessary in order to protect listed 
species, the Departments . . . shall consult with affected tribes and provide written notice to them 
of the intended restriction [on the tribal activity] as far in advance as practicable." Id. For a 
discussion of conservation standards, see supra Section II.C.3. 
156. Secretarial Order 5 5, princ. 3(A). The order states, "Departments shall offer and pro- 
vide such scientific and technical assistance and information as may be available for the develop- 
ment of tribal conservation and management plans to promote the maintenance, restoration, 
enhancement and health of the ecosystems upon which sensitive species (including candidate, 
proposed, and listed species) depend . . . ." Id. See also id., princ. 3(C). In addition, Depart- 
ments "shall promptly notify" affected tribes that federal conservation restrictions are being con- 
sidered for any species, and shall "provide such technical, financial, or other assistance as may be 
appropriate, thereby assisting Indian tribes in identifying and implementing tribal conservation 
and other measures necessary to protect such species." Id. 
157. Secretarial Order 9 5, princ. 3(B). The Order provides that "Departments shall give def- 
erence to tribal conservation and management plans for tribal trust resources that (a) govern 
activities on Indian lands, including, for the purposes of this section, tribally-owned fee lands, and 
(b) address the conservation needs of listed species." Id. With respect to the consultation re- 
quirements in ESA § 7, "tribal conservation and management plans for tribal trust resources that 
govern activities on Indian lands, including . . . tribally-owned fee lands, shall serve as the basis 
for developing any reasonable and prudent alternatives [to activities which would jeopardize a 
listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat], to the extent practicable." Appendix 
3(C)(3)(a). The Appendix also provides that: "The Services shall make a written determination 
describing (i) how the selected [reasonable and prudent] alternative is consistent with their trust 
responsibilities, and (ii) the extent to which tribal conservation and management plans for af- 
fected tribal trust resources can be incorporated into any such alternative." Appendix 
§ 3(C)(3)(d). 
158. See ESA § 7 ,  16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4) (1994); ESA § 10,16 U.S.C. 8 1539(1)(2) (1994). See 
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agreements for management of multi-jurisdictional ecosystems and conser- 
vation of sensitive and listed species.lS9 
Although the Order and Appendix, taken together, promote tribal in- 
terests in sovereignty and utilization of natural resources, a primary short- 
coming of the Order, from the perspective of the participating tribal 
representatives, is that it begs the fundamental question of whether the 
ESA should apply to tribal activities in the first place.160 Another per- 
ceived defect is its failure to recognize an affirmative trust responsibility to 
restore habitat degraded by non-Indian development.16' Moreover, several 
of the Order's provisions, including those which give tribes the power to 
regulate, do not apply to fee lands within reservation b 0 ~ n d a r i e s . l ~ ~  In 
also Jon Margolis, Critics Say "No Surprises" Means No Protection, H I G H  COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 
4,1997, at 10 (noting that HCP7s have become "one of the most prominent tools" used under the 
ESA; while only 14 existed before 1993, there are now "211 in full effect and another 200 in the 
works"); Thomas Jackson, Lessons from the Endangered Species Wars, 12 NAT. F~Es.  & ENV'T 
105, 109 (1997) (citing Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 
Fed. Reg. 32,189 (1997)). See also Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 437 (concluding that Section 7 incidental 
take statement ("ITS") may be issued for non-federal participants in the Columbia River Fish 
Management Plan); Swan View Coalition v. Babbitt, No. 96-172-M-DWM (D. Mont. Oct. 14, 
1997) (copy on file with author) (upholding conservation agreement and Section 7 ITS between 
Fish and Wildlife Service, State of Montana and Plum Creek Timber Company for management 
of checkerboard lands in grizzly bear habitat). 
159. See Appendix 5 2(E). The Appendix states, "In keeping with the Services' initiatives to 
promote voluntary conservation partnerships for listed species and the ecosystems upon which 
they depend, the Services shall consult on a government-to-government basis with the affected 
tribe to determine and provide appropriate assurances that would otherwise be provided to a 
non-Indian." Id. The Appendix continues, "Departments shall . . . pursue intergovernmental 
agreements to formalize arrangements involving sensitive species . . . such as, but not limited to, 
land and resource management . . . . Such agreements shall strive to establish partnerships that 
harmonize the Departments' missions under the Act with the Indian tribe's own ecosystem man- 
agement objectives." Id. $ 6. See also id. § 3(D)(1)-(2). When Indian lands are not involved, but 
tribal trust resources or the exercise of tribal rights may be affected, the agencies must facilitate 
tribal participation through early notification and consultation with the affected tribes regarding 
potential effects of the proposed HCP, and advocate HCP measures "that will restore or enhance 
tribal trust resources." Id. 3(D)(3). 
160. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1084. 
161. Id. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes o f  Tribal Sovereignty: A New 
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
109, 227-33 [hereinafter A New Trust Paradigm]. 
162. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1085. The Order gives tribes greater latitude over "Indian 
lands," which do not include fee lands within reservation boundaries, Secretarial Order 5 3(D), 
than "Indian Country," a more inclusive term, used in many federal statutes, see 18 U.S.C. $ 1151 
and note 2, supra. See, e.g., Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 1 (tribal governments have authority 
over the "health and welfare of ecosystems on Indian lands"); princ. 2 ("tribes manage Indian 
lands in accordance with tribal goals and objectives"). Another example of differential treatment 
is the following excerpt from 3(B): 
Departments shall respect the exercise of tribal sovereignty over the man- 
agement of Indian lands, and tribal trust resources . . . . Departments shall con- 
duct government-to-government consultation to determine the extent to which 
tribal resource management plans for tribal trust resources outside Indian lands 
can be incorporated into actions to address the conservation needs of listed 
species. 
Id. But cf: Secretarial Order 9 5, princ. 3(B) (agencies to give deference to tribal conservation 
plans for trust lands and tribally owned fee lands). The Appendix, in comparison, takes a broader 
approach, by focusing, for the most part, on tribal trust resources, defined as "natural resources, 
either on or off Indian lands, retained by, or reserved by or for Indian tribes through treaties, 
statutes, judicial decisions, and executive orders, which are protected by a fiduciary obligation on 
the part of the United States." Appendix 3 3(B). It provides that agencies shall consult with 
affected Indian tribes when "considering the designation of critical habitat in an area that may 
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spite of these shortcomings, the Order, if fully implemented by the agen- 
cies, marks a significant improvement over the status quo of unilateral fed- 
eral decisionmaking on wildlife issues in Indian Country. 
At the signing ceremony on June 5, 1997, Secretary Babbitt, drawing 
parallels between the day's event and the ceremony's setting, the Treaty 
Room in the Old Executive Office Building, proclaimed that the Tribal 
Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species Order is "the 
equivalent of a treaty because it was created out of a 'mutuality' between 
the United States and 'sovereign tribal governments.' Yet a secretarial 
order is a far cry from treaty-based law. 
Like nearly all executive-branch orders, the Secretarial Order ex- 
pressly states that it does not create any legally enforceable rights or 
change existing law.164 It is not legally binding - neither a tribe nor an 
individual member will be able to bring a direct action under the Order if 
its provisions are vi01ated.l~~ Conversely, treaties do create legally en- 
forceable rights.166 
In addition, the Order explicitly provides that it "will remain in effect 
until amended, superseded, or revoked."167 In other words, although its 
provisions were forged by bilateral negotiations with extensive tribal in- 
put,16' the Order can be revoked or amended unilaterally by a subsequent 
administration (or, for that matter, the current one, should it so choose). 
While treaties may also be unilaterally revoked, such revocation may only 
impact tribal trust resources, tribally-owned fee lands, or the exercise of tribal rights. Critical 
habitat shall not be designated in such areas unless it is determined essential to conserve a listed 
species." Id. 8 3(B)(4). 
163. Remarks of Secretary Bruce Babbitt, Washington, D.C. (June 5, 1997) (cited in Bilateral- 
ism, supra note 97, at 1086). 
164. Secretarial Order 8 2(B), (C). The Order provides that it "is for guidance within the 
Departments only." Id. 9 2(A). 
165. See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, 911 F .  Supp. at 401 (holding that the President's Memoran- 
dum on Government-to-Government Consultation is not legally enforceable, and instead is pri- 
marily "a political tool for implementing the President's personal Indian affairs policy") (citing In 
Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C.Cir. 1980)). See also Dong v. 
Slattery, 84 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that APA does not provide a basis for judicial 
enforcement of executive order on political asylum where order does not create a private right of 
action); Hoopa Valley Tribe, 812 F.2d at 1103 (holding that BIA memorandum on consultation 
with tribes was not legally enforceable, distinguishing Oglala Sioux Tribe, 603 F.2d at 707, on 
grounds that BIA in that case had conceded that its guidelines had the force of law). 
166. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424; Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413. 
167. Secretarial Order 9 11. It is not uncommon for executive orders to be short-lived, either 
by explicit limitation, see, e.g., Hopi Tribe v. Watt, 530 F. Supp. 1217, affd,  719 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 
1983) (citing S.O. 3057, regarding administration of range on Hopi partitioned areas of former 
Navajo-Hopi joint use area), or a subsequent change in administration or administrative policy. 
168. In comparison, Secretary Babbitt noted that the "traditional treaty process . . . has been 
one-sided, overbearing and not infrequently unfair." Remarks of Secretary Babbitt, supra note 
163. Support for this statement is incontrovertible. See, e.g., Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371. See also 
Charles F.  Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As 
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows on the Earth" - How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. 
REV. 601, 608-12 (1975); Regis-Civetta, supra note 6, at 311-12. 
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be accomplished by C o n g r e ~ s . ' ~ ~  
Further, in the hierarchy of legal precedent, administrative orders are 
found at the bottom. Orders signed by cabinet-level secretaries are typi- 
cally considered to be interpretive rules, which merely clarify existing law 
or reg~1ations.l'~ Such rules "are essentially hortatory and instructional in 
that they go more to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or 
regulation means, when applied in particular, narrowly defined, 
~ituations."'~' 
On the other hand, although executive policy is not directly enforcea- 
ble, an agency's failure to comply with the guidance set forth in a secreta- 
rial order may be grounds for invalidation of the agency action as 
"arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act.17* 
More importantly, courts can look to the provisions of an executive order 
for guidance in interpreting the common law trust obligation, and in deter- 
mining whether an agency's affirmative trust responsibilities have been 
met.173 At least one court has referred to  an executive policy in analyzing 
the federal common law trust duty, in spite of the fact that the policy itself 
was not enf0rceab1e.l~~ Thus, an administrative order may provide a mech- 
anism for the executive and the judiciary to put flesh on the bare bones of 
the trust ~ 0 n c e p t . l ~ ~  
The Secretarial Order's provisions provide specific guidance for the 
courts in reviewing whether the agencies have met their affirmative duty to 
fulfill the trust obligation while implementing the ESA. The Order (more 
specifically, the Appendix), in spite of its non-binding character, contains 
many desirable provisions - both substantive and procedural - which, if 
169. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 745. 
170. Seldovia Native Association, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted)). Substantive 
rules, by comparison, "'are those which effect a change in existing law or policy.'" Alcaraz, 746 
F.2d at 613 (quoting Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1983)). Efforts to 
change existing law through secretarial orders are often met with judicial skepticism. See Arizona 
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 635-37 & 1111.25-26 (1983) (Secretary's ex parte resolution of dispute 
over reservation boundaries through secretarial order, while boundary issue was pending before 
Court in water adjudication, was not final or binding). 
171. Alcaraz, 746 F.2d at 613 (quoting Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. 
Cir. 1952)). 
172. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1345 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 446 n.30 (1987) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)); Peabody Coal Co. v. Andrus, 
477 F. Supp. 120 (D. Wyo. 1979). 
173. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 752 (noting that "since the trust obligation is, 
fundamentally, one deriving from federal common law, the duties owed to the tribes are present 
and enforceable in court whether or not agencies articulate those duties in the form of binding 
rules"). See also Oglala Sioux, 603 F.2d at 720-21 (considering BIA's internal guidelines in hold- 
ing that the failure to consult with tribe before making decision to reassign an Indian Superinten- 
dent violated the BIA's trust responsibility to the tribe). 
174. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Environmental Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465,1470- 
72 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that government's fulfillment of trust responsibility in implementing 
generally applicable statute such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act "must be mea- 
sured against the 'backdrop' of tribal sovereignty"). 
175. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 220-28 (trust responsibilities can be defined by, inter alia, 
treaties, statutes and executive orders). 
412 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
enforced as an expression of the trust responsibility, could go a long way 
toward alleviating concerns in the designation of critical habitat. 
As for the procedural duty of government-to-government consulta- 
tion, the Order provides for early notification and involvement, informa- 
tion exchange, deference to tribal management plans and a preference for 
cooperative agreements, and it encourages federal assistance to tribes for 
development of management plans and agreements.176 It acknowledges 
that tribes are the "appropriate governmental entities" to manage tribal 
lands and resources.17' 
The Appendix also encourages inter-governmental  partnership^,'^^ but 
falls short of requiring co-management of tribal resources, even those on 
tribal lands - FWS and NMFS still hold the trump card in the case of 
disputes.'79 Co-management, if embraced by the agencies, could provide 
an important tool for effectuating the Order's policy of harmonizing the 
trust responsibility with species conservation. Co-management of trust re- 
sources has been employed successfully to resolve ongoing disputes be- 
tween states and tribes over treaty fishing rights.''' The BIA and federal 
176. See Secretarial Order 5 5, princ. 1 & 3; Appendix $0 2(D)-(E), 3. Of course, whether 
money for tribal conservation measures will be forthcoming in future federal appropriations re- 
mains to be seen. If the track record of the 104th and 105th Congresses on funding of Indian 
programs is any indication of future budgets, tribes may be unlikely to see the Secretarial Order's 
policies translated into cash. See James Brooke, Cruel Winter on N. Dakota Reservation, AMZ. 
&P., Jan. 28, 1997, at A1 (midwestern blizzards hit Indians hardest due to dramatic cuts in fed- 
eral funds for housing improvements and weatherization); Ada Deer, Proposed 1997 Budget Cuts 
Would Devastate Nation's Tribes, FORT APACHE SCOUT, June 21, 1996, at 3 (forecasting shortfalls 
in FY 1997 appropriations, and describing effects of FY 1995 and FY 1996 funding cuts); Robert 
T. Nelson, Gorton Could Chair Indian Affairs Panel, SEATTLE TIMES, NOV. 7, 1996, at B4 (noting 
track record of Senator Gorton, chair of Interior appropriations subcommittee, in cutting funds 
from BIA budget); Enric Volante, Indian Tribes Feel Sense of Betrayal, ARIZ. STAR, Dec. 11, 
1995, at 1 A  (proposals to cut a third of the BIA's budget could result in. "termination by appro- 
priation instead of by legislation"). 
177. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(B). 
178. Appendix 8 6. 
179. See id. Q 9(A) (providing that disputes be addressed through "government-to-govern- 
ment" discourse respectful of tribal policies and agreements). 
180. See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of 
the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 375, 406-11 [hereinafter Summer] (discussing Chip- 
pewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishing Management Authority in Michigan, and the involvement of inter- 
tribal commissions in the Columbia River Fish Management Plan for management of salmon and 
steelhead); GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 858 (citing Minn. Stat. Q 97.431 (1984)). In re- 
sponse to a court order in Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 
(D. Minn. 1971), the state and the tribe entered into a cooperative agreement governing hunting, 
fishing and trapping on the reservation, which was ratified by the legislature and incorporated 
into a consent judgment. See Minn. Stat. 5 97.431 (1984). See akso Cooperative Agreement Be- 
tween the Grand Portage Band of Chippewa and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (July 
16, 1996) [hereinafter Grand Portage Agreement] (agreeing to jointly manage water quality con- 
cerns on portion of Lake Superior shoreline which is particularly important to, inter alia, tribal 
fisheries). Co-management agreements for fisheries typically include provisions for harvest man- 
agement (including gear, seasons and catch limits), tribal-state enforcement, stocking and hatch- 
ery programs, and information exchange. See Summer, supra, at 407, 411. See also GETCHES ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 859, 881-82 (describing cooperative agreements, including joint manage- 
ment plan for Great Lakes fisheries, which provide for cooperative administration of commercial 
fishing, recordkeeping, data collection and exchange, and a dispute resolution framework); 
Grand Portage Agreement, supra, Section 111 (providing for information exchange and communi- 
cations between tribal and state staff members), Section IV. D (agreeing to consult before taking 
enforcement actions), Section V (providing dispute resolution procedures which call upon the U. 
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wildlife agencies have, at times, entered into cooperative agreements for 
management of natural resource development on Indian landslgl and 
broad-ranging fish and wildlife species that traverse Indian lands.lg2 Simi- 
larly, in the international arena, it is not at all uncommon for the federal 
government to turn to intergovernmental agreements to manage species 
which cross jurisdictional 1ines.lg3 
Given the United States' trust responsibility and self-determination 
policy, tribal sovereignty and the tribes' intimate knowledge of reservation 
co-management agreements with bilateral decision-making 
authority are particularly appropriate when federal agencies assert control 
over wildlife and its habitat on Indian lands. Such arrangements, either in 
the form of cooperative agreements governing discrete issues or memo- 
randa of understanding, which are broader in scope, could provide effective 
habitat protections consistent with tribal norms and needs, in lieu of critical 
habitat designation.ls5 
While the Order's provisions for cooperative agreements do not pro- 
vide a specific mandate or "blueprint" for co-management arrangements, 
neither do they preclude them. The need for individualized approaches 
counsels against a "one size fits all" formulation of provisions, given varia- 
tions among tribes' social, legal and economic norms and requirements and 
the diverse needs of species, the characteristics of the habitat at issue and 
the dynamics of the surrounding ecosystem. In general, however, certain 
provisions would likely be important in any setting. For example, agree- 
ments should include provisions for dispute resolution, giving appropriate 
deference to the tribe; the sharing of monitoring data regarding habitat 
condition, species productivity, and ongoing and planned future activities 
in the area; and enforcement authority and responsibilities. The Order, 
which addresses these issues, albeit in a general fashion, is flexible enough 
S. Environmental Protection Agency to assist in resolution of conflicts over water quality 
standards). 
181. See 25 U.S.C. P 3115 (1994) (encouraging Secretary of Interior, through the BIA, to enter 
into cooperative agreements for management of tribal forestry resources). 
182. See, e.g., Proposed Establishment of Nonessential Experimental Population of Grey 
Wolves in Central Idaho, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,118, 42,123 (1994) (encouraging tribes and states to 
enter into cooperative agreements for managing reintroduced wolves); Nez Perce Tribal Wolf 
Recovery and Management Plan for Idaho (1995) (copy on file with author) (implementing FWS- 
tribal agreement for Nez Perce Tribe to manage federally reintroduced wolves in Idaho). Federal 
land management agencies, on the other hand, have resisted giving tribes what they fear is a 
"veto" authority over otherwise discretionary activities, particularly where the resource at issue, 
for example, fish or game species, occurs on federal public lands. See United States' Memoran- 
dum on Motions for Summary Judgment at 24-27 (June 18, 1996) and Reply at 17-22 (July 19, 
1996) in Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509 at *3 (arguing that the duty to consult does not include 
a right of tribal concurrence or co-management authority, which could result in a form of tribal 
veto over management of federal forest lands that support treaty-protected wildlife resources). 
183. See Summer, supra note 180, at 410. See generally Symposium on Transboundary 
Problems in Natural Resources Law, 32 U .  KAN. L. REV. (1983). 
184. For further discussion of the role of traditional ecological knowledge and values in wild- 
life management, see Section IV.A.2, infra. 
185. See Summer, supra note 180, at 411 & 11.191; Section IV.A.2, infra. 
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to guide partnerships and address relevant management issues in a diverse 
array of situations. 
With respect to the substantive duty toward both tribal wildlife re- 
sources and property interests, the Order evidences an overarching policy 
of equitable distribution of environmental burdens. Several of the Order's 
provisions could be construed as requiring prioritization of tribal needs, 
both for conservation of resources and for utilization of those resources, 
over non-tribal interests. In particular, Principle 3(C) provides that tribes 
should be given a chance to implement their own conservation measures 
where necessary to protect a species, "at the earliest indication that the 
need for federal conservation measures is being ~ons idered ." '~~  If restric- 
tions are still deemed necessary, with respect to activities such as habitat 
alterations which could result in incidental take, the conservation standards 
are to be followed.18' Importantly, the Order lists all five conservation 
standards - including a requirement that, before the agency may regulate 
tribal activities, conservation purposes "cannot be achieved by reasonable 
regulation of non-Indian activities."188 
In addition, with respect to critical habitat, the Appendix provides that 
designations shall not occur on Indian lands unless "determined essential 
to conserve a listed species."1s9 Presumably, the determination of what is 
"essential" for conservation remains within the broad discretion of FWS. 
This provision, standing alone, leaves too much discretion in agency hands. 
However, the federal common law should curtail agency discretion where 
Indian lands and resources are involved by providing guidelines through 
the trust responsibility, which translates to a higher level of protection and 
a means to establish a hierarchy of priorities for Indian interests.lgO 
Finally, in making the designation decision, the Appendix directs the 
agencies to "evaluate and document the extent to which the conservation 
needs of the listed species can be achieved by limiting the designation to 
other lands."'91 This requirement forces the agencies to build a record by 
weighing options which might avoid the need for designation on Indian 
lands. Affected tribes should be able to shape that record through input 
and participation. If the agency's ultimate conclusion goes against the fac- 
tual findings in the record, including the evidence submitted by the tribes, 
the decision to designate would be found arbitrary and capricious,192 and 
186. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(C). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. For a discussion of the standards, see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
189. Appendix 5 3(B)(4). 
190. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 745, 747. Professor Wood argued that the trust 
obligation to protect tribal resources should result in a higher level of ecological protection than 
if solely non-Indian interests were at stake, in part because federal agencies are not empowered 
to compromise, ignore or abrogate Indian rights. Id. 
191. Appendix § 3(B)(4). 
192. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). See Motor Vehicles Mfrs.., 463 U.S. at 43. An agency's 
action will be found arbitrary and capricious if: 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an expla- 
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perhaps even a violation of the trust re~ponsibi1ity.l~~ 
A designation decision which includes tribal lands might also be found 
inconsistent with the language of the ESA itself, which requires FWS to 
consider not only the scientific criteria for designation, but also economic 
and other relevant impacts.'94 Further, the ESA provides that identified 
areas should be excluded from the final critical habitat designation if the 
"benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of designation" unless exclu- 
sion would result in extinction of the species.lg5 If the agencies had any 
doubt as to the "relevancy" of the trust obligation in implementing the 
ESA, the Order makes it abundantly clear that effects on trust resources, 
be they economic in nature or otherwise, are relevant, and that such effects 
should weigh heavily against designation. The Order, if enforced, effectu- 
ates these express statutory provisions in a manner consistent with the trust 
responsibility. 
Indeed, the Order and Appendix, taken as a whole, are imbued with a 
spirit of tribal self-regulation and environmental self-determination, bal- 
anced with the government's mandate to conserve species. Together, they 
put tribes and listed species on at least an even playing field, and affirma- 
tively elevate tribal needs to a higher priority than the development inter- 
ests of surrounding, non-Indian landowners and actors. 
Although the Order is "no Olympian moment in federal Indian pol- 
icy," it is a fair and reasoned approach to a "thorny area" of the law.196 It 
provides more concrete guidance than was previously available to either 
the agencies themselves or the courts; in doing so, it curbs free-ranging 
agency discretion. Yet it does not strait-jacket agencies or tribes with any 
one solution, and allows flexibility to address fact-specific situations, in- 
cluding diverse tribal needs and objectives, habitat variations, and the con- 
servation needs of species in a particular ecosystem, given past and present 
activities both on- and off-reservation. If implemented by the agencies and 
enforced by the courts, the Order could be a valuable tool for effectuating 
tribal sovereignty and the trust responsibility. 
nation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise. 
Id. 
193. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F .  Supp. at 256. 
194. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 5 1533(b)(2) (1994). 
195. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(2). It would seem that, given this express statutory requirement, 
critical habitat designations would never occur in Indian Country unless there were concrete 
biological evidence that exclusion of Indian lands would result in extinction. This, however, is not 
how the statute has been implemented to date. For an analysis and discussion of designations for 
the Mexican Spotted Owl, San Juan River fish species and the Southwest Willow Flycatcher, see 
infra, Section IV.A.3. 
196. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1088. 
416 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
IV. THE ESA'S CRITICAL HABITAT PROVISIONS SHOULD 
APPLY T O  INDIAN LANDS ONLY AS A MATTER OF 
LAST RESORT AND THEN ONLY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH T H E  SECRETARIAL ORDER'S GUIDELINES 
There are many compelling reasons why tribal interests must be given 
the highest priority in the designation of critical habitat. The importance of 
the reservation as an island of sovereignty, cultural identity and economic 
survival mandates the most careful and exacting consideration of activities 
which may affect reservation resources. Additionally, the trust responsibil- 
ity to protect tribal resources and sovereignty and the need to restore dis- 
tributive justice in environmental and economic affairs both tip the scales 
in favor of tribal interests. Finally, traditional ecological knowledge and 
values, which play an important role in tribal environmental decision-mak- 
ing, must be given primacy when non-Indian objectives are asserted in In- 
dian Country. 
I .  Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and the Trust Responsibility 
Tribes, as sovereign entities, possess unique political attributes which 
private landowners simply do not have.197 Tribal sovereignty includes ex- 
pansive control over reservation lands and resources, and extends to the 
harvest of wildlife species as well as the utilization of reservation lands, 
even lands which provide habitat for listed species.198 In most cases, tribal 
sovereignty, along with the federal trust responsibility, justify exclusion of 
Indian lands from critical habitat designation. 
Development of reservation resources affords tribes with an opportu- 
nity - sometimes the only opportunity - to achieve self-sufficiency and to 
generate investment capital for future projects, including economic devel- 
opment, education, health services and cultural ~ r 0 g r a m s . l ~ ~  The develop- 
ment of natural resources through extractive industries such as coal, 
uranium, oil and gas, and silviculture has long been the predominant ave- 
nue for economic development on many reservations.200 These are the 
very activities most likely to be affected by the designation decision. 
Given the importance of tribal lands and resources to the well-being of 
197. See, e.g., Morton, 417 U.S. at 555 (holding BIA's hiring preferences for American Indians 
do not violate equal protection principles because such preferences are not based on impermissi- 
ble racial classifications but on the United States' "unique obligation" toward tribes); Secretarial 
Order Q 4 (stating "[tlhe unique and distinctive political relationship between the United States 
and Indian tribes. . . differentiates tribes from other entities that deal with, or are affected by, the 
federal government"). 
198. For a discussion, see supra Section 1.3.2. 
199. For a discussion, see infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
200. See MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS 31-33 (1990); Tsosie, supra note 46, 
at 231; Judith Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control 
Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L. J. 541, 542-44 (1993). 
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tribes with a reservation land base, "environmental self-determination" - 
the right to exercise autonomy over tribal lands and resources - no less 
than other aspects of self-determination, is critical to tribal sovereignty.201 
Tribes themselves must balance the need for survival and a decent standard 
of living with preservation of Indian lands and wildlife resources in a man- 
ner most appropriate to their own norms and values.202 Accordingly, the 
federal government, in keeping with its trust responsibility to help preserve 
the political, physical and cultural integrity of Indian Nations, should ad- 
vance programs and policies which foster environmental self-determination 
and avoid interference with tribal priorities, norms and values. 
The ESA's provisions for the protection of habitat, viewed through the 
lens of tribal self-determination, fail on both counts: critical habitat 
designation in Indian Country enforces external, non-tribally driven pre- 
rogatives, thereby interfering with tribal sovereignty, and has little relation 
to tribal ecological norms and values. In other environmental areas, such 
as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, explicit tribal amendments 
strive to resolve potential conflicts between tribal and federal policies by 
including Indian tribes within the larger goals of society with specific guide- 
lines, funding and delegation of programs to tribes.203 In contrast, the ESA 
makes no attempt to reconcile the sometimes disparate values reflected in 
federal and tribal environmental policies.204 For example, the ESA makes 
funding available for state programs, but not for tribal initiatives.205 In ad- 
dition, the ESA's single-species approach is generally inconsistent with tri- 
bal objectives in managing multiple resources and sustainable 
201. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 227. The term "environmental self-determination" as used in 
the present article embraces environmental stewardship, sustainability and utilization of natural 
resources. 
202. See James L. Huffman, An Exploratory Essay on Native Americans and Environmental- 
ism, 63 U .  COLO. L. REV. 901, 916 & 11.62 (1992) (noting that environmental protection is argua- 
bly a "luxury good" that only the wealthy can support). 
203. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 242, 330. Even these statutes sometimes fall short. One com- 
mentator noted: "[i]t should come as no surprise that Indian values and belief systems are not 
reflected in or accepted by our environmental law," which is incapable of expressing intimate 
relationships between the physical, spiritual and social worlds. Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1153. 
The converse is true, however - tribal policy is "heavily impacted by the values and norms of 
Anglo-American society, embodied in federal environmental law and policy." Tsosie, supra note 
46, at 232,242. All in all, federal environmental law "perpetuates the legacy of European coloni- 
alism and racism against American Indian peoples." Telescopes, supra, at 1156. 
204. See generally Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. $$I531 et seq. (1994). Section 
10(e), 16 U.S.C. Q 1539(e), the only provision of the ESA which references Indian interests, pro- 
vides an exemption for Alaska Natives who may take protected species "if such taking is primar- 
ily for subsistence purposes" and is accomplished in a non-wasteful manner. Id. 
205. See ESA $ 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1994). It has been noted that: "[tlhe lack of Tribal fund- 
ing mechanisms under the ESA places a huge financial burden on tribes to manage sensitive 
species." Ronnie Lupe, Chairman's Corner: Congress Hears About Our Relationship with the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, FORT APACHE SCOUT, Aug. 4, 1995, at 2 (recounting testimony 
given to Senator Kempthorne and other members of the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works) [hereinafter Chairman's Corner]. 
206. See Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. The White Mountain Apache believe "that man- 
aging ecosystems rather than individual listed species is the most practical long-term approach to 
preserving biodiversity which is the ultimate intent of the [ESA]," yet the ESA dictates consider- 
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Designation of critical habitat is particularly offensive, in that it effec- 
tively imposes a federal zoning system on Indian Iands by creating a wild- 
life "district" zoned for habitat uses, while incompatible uses, such as oil 
and gas development, must be undertaken elsewhere.207 In this way, 
designation places federal wildlife priorities over Indian interests. As Jus- 
tices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall noted in their dissent in the 
Brendale case, 
It would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to 'the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,' than the 
power to zone . . . . This fundamental sovereign power of local gov- 
ernments to control land use is especially vital to Indians, who enjoy a 
unique historical and cultural connection to the land.208 
The Justices went on to state that the inability to "engage in the systematic 
and coordinated utilization of land" would have a severe impact on tribal 
self-governance.*09 Like the challenge to the Yakama Nation's zoning au- 
thority in Brendale, the imposition of critical habitat over portions of the 
reservation results in patch-work administration of the land base and effec- 
tively defeats comprehensive tribal planning. Moreover, designation signif- 
icantly limits tribal sovereignty by preventing the use of Indian lands in a 
manner consistent with traditional ecological knowledge, economic goals 
and tribal  ethic^.^" 
It would be a mistake, however, to consider tribes' interests in re- 
source utilization without also considering their interests in preservation. 
It is plausible, at least at first blush, that critical habitat designations, which 
have as their goal the protection of listed species, advance the interests of 
Indian Nations in the preservation of their land and resources from envi- 
ronmental degradation. Along these lines, Professor Mary Wood argues 
that the trust responsibility should require federal agencies, particularly the 
BIA, to safeguard tribes from the adverse effects of development activi- 
ation of one species at a time. Id. See 16 U.S.C. 8 1533(b)(l)(B). Tribes are not alone in the 
belief that ecosystem management is preferable than the single species approach. See Holly 
Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark; Empowering Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 265 (1991) (proposing an extension of Endangered Species Act protections to 
embrace ecosystem management concepts); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Con- 
structing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U .  COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994) (arguing that a fed- 
eral ecosystem mandate be adopted); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever- 
Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely 
Different? 66 U .  COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995) [hereinafter Biodiversity] (stating that ecosystem- 
based partnerships between federal, state, and private agencies are desirable for private lands 
conservation). See also Oliver A. Houck, On the Law o f  Biodiversity and Ecosystem Manage- 
ment, 81 M I N N .  L. REV. 869,975-76 (1997) (discussing uncertainties of ecosystem approach, and 
concluding that it remains necessary to protect individual species as provided in the ESA). 
207. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,  PROPER^ LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRAC- 
TICES 653-54 (2d ed. 1997). Critical habitat is akin to a traditional zoning, or land use, regulation, 
in that it divides land into areas in accordance with uses deemed acceptable and consistent with 
the public or community good, thereby inhibiting the private landowner's use and enjoyment of 
property. See id. 
208. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)). 
209. Id. 
210. For specific examples where critical habitat designation has disproportionately burdened 
Indian lands, see infra Section IV.A.3. 
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ties,2" and even to deny lease transactions approved by the tribal council if 
they are not in the "best interest" of the tribe.212 
The concerns presented by natural resources development on Indian 
lands should in no way be minimized. The protection of wildlife and its 
habitat is at least as important in Indian Country as it is elsewhere. As 
resources on state, federal and private lands become more and more de- 
pleted, Indian Country is seen as prime property for some of the most in- 
tensive uses of natural resources, including strip-mining, timber harvest, 
grazing, and solid and hazardous waste disposal. Indian lands, "[plushed to 
the perimeter of 'civilization' during the years of westward expansion, are 
now often perceived as fields of opportunity for a nation faced with the 
dismal legacy of ove rde~e lopment . "~~~  There are many distressing exam- 
ples of adverse environmental effects resulting from extractive industries, 
particularly those perpetrated by non-Indian mining interests.214 Nonethe- 
less, a standard which would allow BIA to disapprove tribal initiatives uni- 
laterally would severely undermine tribal sovereignty and self- 
d e t e r m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Tribes considering development opportunities that result 
in alteration of the natural environment face a difficult choice, yet it is 
plainly a choice which they are entitled to make for themselves. 
Moreover, any temptation to believe that Indian tribes should engage 
211. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1480-89. 
212. Id. at 1480, 1550-51. The best interest standard finds its source in numerous tribal re- 
source statutes, including the timber management and mineral leasing statutes. See, e.g., 25 
U.S.C. $0 406-407 (1994) (timber management), $§ 399, 2102 (mineral royalties and leasing), 
§§ 331, 382 (irrigation projects). Professor Wood indicated that tribal dissension might serve as a 
harbinger for BIA disapproval of tribal council decisions. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 
1486-88 & n.77, 1551-64. Certainly, tribes, like most societal groups, do not always present a 
unified front. Disparate views within a tribe, some of which advocate traditional "Indian ways" 
and others who would more readily seize modern-day development opportunities, make it diffi- 
cult to craft any legal standard to guide the "best interest" inquiry. Proposals for nuclear waste 
storage facilities have perhaps generated the most publicized examples of intra-tribal conflict. 
See, e.g., David Rich Lewis, Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Cen- 
tury Issues, 19 AM. INDIAN Q. 423,1995 WL 14787562 (June 1, 1995) (describing interest of some 
tribal leaders, including the Mescalero Apache council president, in monitored retrievable stor- 
age facilities for nuclear waste from commercial reactors, and opposition by tribal members); 
Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1486 n.75 (describing opposition and protests). Uranium mining 
has also been a subject of internal controversy. See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 
1977) (members challenged EIS for mining agreement between tribal government and Exxon). 
For examples of tribal discord on natural resource development issues in general, see Indian 
Land, supra note 28, at 1486-87 and nn. 73-76. While in no way discounting the difficulties posed 
by intra-tribal disagreement on environmental issues, the bottom line here is, again, dictated by 
principles of self-determination - tribes themselves are the appropriate entities to sort out these 
thorny issues pursuant to their own objectives and values; no one else, BIA included, should 
purport to act as arbiter. 
213. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 225. Professor Tsosie provided a detailed and thoughtful discus- 
sion of the challenges facing Indian Nations today in the face of competing demands for eco- 
nomic development and preservation of important natural resources. She noted that competing 
views within tribes themselves, pitting economic against preservationist interests, "appear rnutu- 
ally exclusive" yet, "American Indian nations, like all societies, must try to do  both": preserve 
the past while ensuring future economic development. Id. at 226. 
214. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1481-86; AMBLER, supra note 200, at 174-92. 
215. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1551 (acknowledging that "[alny judicial invalidation 
of a transaction initially approved by a tribal government naturally strikes many as an invasion 
into tribal prerogative"). 
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only in traditional, non-extractive activities, and to presume that non-tradi- 
tional development which could result in environmental degradation is not 
in the tribes' best interests, must be firmly rejected.216 Although some 
tribes have maintained traditional land-based ec~nomies,~" traditional ac- 
tivities may not be lucrative or even available to many tribes, due to forced 
removal from familiar homelands and limited opportunities for economic 
survival in the desolate, arid areas where most reservations are situated.218 
The ESA, overlaid with principles of tribal sovereignty, must allow some 
level of environmental impact on Indian lands, particularly that which re- 
sults from Indian-owned or controlled activities - be they traditional or 
non-traditional - as an inevitable consequence of utilization of reservation 
Perhaps more to the point, the prohibitions flowing from critical 
habitat designation are more likely to be detrimental to tribal interests than 
to comport with a standard which reflects the best interests of tribes. In 
fact, designation can be adverse both to the very conservation duty it pur- 
ports to advance and to tribal environmental self-determination. Critical 
habitat, based on the needs of a single species rather than the needs of an 
216. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 326. The selection of a "nontraditional means of economic 
development does not mean that the tribe has abandoned all of its traditional norms"; instead, it 
may simply represent a choice to ensure "survival . . . and a decent standard of living." Id. 
Professor Tsosie noted: "It would be unfair to expect Indian people to always choose [traditional 
norms of the relationship of humans to the environment] over [norms ensuring the survival of the 
people and a decent standard of living], particularly in light of the severe poverty and deprivation 
that plague many reservations today." Id. at 324-25. Indian development of coal and timber 
resources and use of modern fishing and agricultural methods is not contradictory with their 
reputation as "stewards of the earth. Indian cultures have survived because they d o  use the 
earth's resources, but with a sensitive touch." David H. Getches, A Philosophy of Permanence, J .  
OF THE WEST 54-68 (1990) (emphasis added). See Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1153-54. Profes- 
sor Williams noted: "Whether land should be used or developed in a certain way depends on the 
peoples' needs." Id. If, for example, a landfill or waste dump "can be located in an area which is 
not being utilized by the tribe, then that option will be considered, along with its impact down to 
the seventh generation of the tribe yet to come." Conversely, "[ilf the hazardous waste dump is 
going to be put in a place where important spiritual, social, or physical values of the tribe are 
implicated, then the tribe doesn't even think about it. It's just not done. There is an attitude of 
deep and abiding respect for the land and the resources it yields." Id. 
217. See LaDuke, supra note 48, at 140-42 (describing examples of successful tribal efforts to 
employ traditional practices, such as wild rice gathering, fishing, forestry and sustainable dry- 
farming practices, both for domestic uses and production for exchange or export). See also Coali- 
tion of Tribes Hopes to Take Lead in Bison Industry, CHAR-KOOSTA NEWS, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1 
(reporting that Intertribal Bison Cooperative, with 39 member tribes, was awarded a First Na- 
tions Development Institute grant to manage bison herds for cultural and business purposes, 
including the sale of meat, tannery operations, artwork and tourism). 
218. See Royster, supra note 200, at 544. For tribes whose reservations are situated in remote 
territory with high rates of unemployment, "the mineral estate represents the best, if not the only, 
hope for economic development." Id. See generally Frank Pommersheim, Economic Develop- 
ment in Indian Country: What are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 195 (1987) [hereinafter 
Economic Development]. Moreover, arid landholdings in the West are likely to remain so with- 
out the development of water resource projects, such as dams and diversion works. However, 
because Indian development has lagged behind that of other western interests, many tribes will 
likely be unable to enjoy the benefits of their water rights, leaving them with even fewer options 
for economic survival. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 1326-29. 
219. See Mark Allen, Native American Control of Tribal Natural Resource Development in the 
Context of the Federal Trust and Tribal Self-Determination, 16 B.C.  EN^. AFF. L. REV. 857 
(1989) (discussing the need for tribal control of natural resources development). 
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ecosystem or community of interacting resources,220 is not necessarily envi- 
ronmentally beneficial, and can prevent management measures necessary 
for the conservation of other wildlife species and natural  resource^.^^' 
Meanwhile, designation can delay or even prevent development of eco- 
nomic resources. 
Finally, while environmentalists and neighboring 1and0wneI-s~~~ criti- 
cize tribes for accepting development proposals that pose potential danger 
to the environment,223 the true effects of carefully planned development 
may have little to do with environmental impacts. The major issues faced 
by tribes planning development activities may instead be ill-begotten ste- 
reotypes, paternalism, and even outright racism.224 The "noble savage" 
ideal, foisted on tribes by 19th and early 20th century novelists and philoso- 
phers, notably, James Fenimore Cooper and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and 
some modern day environmental interest groups, would have Indians reject 
economic development altogether if it did not comport with traditional life- 
ways "in harmony with nature."225 Dean Huffman paints a powerful pic- 
ture of the likely result of such beliefs: "While white Americans pursue 
harmony with mother nature from their comfortable offices . . . and high 
tech kayaks . . ., Native Americans will struggle to feed their children and 
make sense of a culture not of nature but of alcohol, poverty and despera- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  Clearly, any formulation of a standard for reviewing development 
220. See Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. 5 1533(b)(l)(B) (1994) (the designation 
decision is to be based on the physical and biological features essential to the individual listed 
species). Although the ESA's statement of policy does provide that ecosystems should be con- 
served, the substantive, enforceable provisions of the Act are directed at the needs of individual 
species. Compare 16 U.S.C. 5 1531(b) (general policy) with $$ 1533(b)(l)(B) (designation crite- 
ria), 1540 (penalties provision) and 1540(g) (citizen suits). 
221. See Catron County, 75 F.2d at 1436; Fund for Animals, 903 F.  Supp. at 96. For a discus- 
sion of the ineffectiveness of critical habitat as a conservation tool see Section II.C.l, infra. For a 
comparison of more holistic management approaches taken by various tribes see Section 1V.B. 
in fra. 
222. The "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY") syndrome is a well-documented phenomenon. 
See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353,373 
(1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
223. It is also true that environmentalists, who are sometimes the most vocal opponents of 
tribal development proposals, have supported tribal efforts to stop environmentally destructive 
development on or near Indian lands, though their objectives are often quite different than those 
of the tribe. See, e.g., Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1161 (noting that environmental members of 
the Apache Survival Coalition were cynical about the sacred nature of Mt. Graham but joined 
forces with the tribe simply to stop construction of multiple telescopes on its peaks). 
224. See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribes 
approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U .  COLO. L. 
REV. 933, 941-42 (1992) (discussing the Campo Band's proposal to lease tribal lands to a solid 
waste management firm for the siting of a landfill). 
225. See FERGUS BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 34-35,48 (1996). See also 
Huffman, supra note 202, at 909-10; Tsosie, supra note 46, at 323 (non-Indians, having decimated 
their own natural resources, have proposed that tribes opt for "eco-tourism" as an appropriate 
means of economic stability, to ensure that Indian lands remain pristine); Gover & Walker, supra 
note 224, at 942 ("[Tlhe 'noble savage' stereotype that leads one to believe that 'real Indians'. . . 
would never harm their environment. . . smacks of the same arrogance that led fifteenth-century 
Europeans to conclude that they had 'discovered' America."); Lewis, supra note 212, at 423,1995 
WL 14787562, *16-18 (stereotyping Indians as "the original conservationists" denies their "hu- 
manity, culture, history, and most importantly, their modernity"). 
226. Huffman, supra note 202, at 903. 
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proposals on Indian lands must eradicate the vestiges of colonialism and 
respect tribal sovereignty and self-determinati~n.~~' 
2. Traditional Ecological Values Play the Preeminent Role in Preserving 
the Reservation as a Homeland 
Reservation lands - the most important trust resource for many 
tribeszz8 - can rightfully be characterized as critical habitat for the Ameri- 
can Indian tribes who at one point in our country's history 
were fully expected to go extinct.230 The reservation today marks "the en- 
during survival of Indian communities from a marauding western society," 
as well as the fulfillment of individual and tribal vitality.231 Professor Frank 
Pommersheim describes the reservation as a "place" essential to an individ- 
ual's well-being and sense of belonging, and to tribal sovereignty and self- 
d e t e r m i n a t i ~ n : ~ ~ ~  "The reservation is home. It is a place where the land 
lives and stalks people, where the land looks after people and makes them 
live right, a place where the earth's ways provide solace and nurture."z33 
227. See A New Trust Paradigm, supra note 161, at 128-32 (providing standards for determin- 
ing whether development activities are consistent with tribal interests). In keeping with an over- 
riding objective of preserving sovereignty and resisting assimilation, Professor Wood proposed 
that the "focal points for trust analysis" of federal actions which affect Indian resources should be 
"(1) a stable land base; (2) a functioning economy; (3) the ability to govern; and (4) cultural and 
religious vitality." Id. The Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endan- 
gered Species, which provides for government-to-government consultations, cooperative manage- 
ment and prioritization of Indian interests, while conserving imperiled species in Indian Country 
and beyond, both advances Indian sovereignty and counters assimilative forces. Its provisions, if 
implemented by the agencies and enforced by the courts, would provide a vehicle for meeting 
Wood's four-pronged approach for fulfilling the trust responsibility toward tribal land and re- 
sources, at least in the context of ESA enforcement. For a discussion of the Order, see Section 
III(B)-(C), supra. 
228. For a discussion of the reservation resource, see Section I(B)(2), supra. 
229. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 1331. Hansen noted: "The lack of economic activity has 
left many western Indian reservations poor but picturesque enclaves of critical habitat." Id. 
230. See Stanley M. Pollack, Native Fishes vs. Native Americans: Endangered Species in Con- 
flict, GREENFIRE REP. 3-4 (1992) (asserting that American Indians are themselves "endangered 
species"; thus, the ESA calls for a different approach when tribal interests are implicated); Miller, 
supra note 115, at 578-79 (abrogation of treaty fishing rights through the application of ESA 
restrictions would result in severe impacts to tribal culture, religion and welfare, and could be 
considered genocide under international treaties). See also Michael L. Chiropolos, Inupiat Sub- 
sistence and the Bowhead Whale: Can Indigenous Hunting Cultures Coexist with Endangered 
Animal Species?, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L & POL'Y 213, 234 (1994) (noting that threats to 
Inupiat subsistence caused by oil exploration "illustrate[] the inherent precariousness of any situ- 
ation when endangered cultures are dependent upon endangered species"). The "Vanishing Red 
Man" theory - that American Indians were racially inferior and therefore doomed to extinction 
- is thought to have provided the United States with justification for relocating tribes from their 
homelands. See James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of Imperial 
Archeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 22 (1992); Jack F. Trope & Walter R. 
Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Leg- 
islative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992). 
231. Place, supra note 18, at 246. Tribal land provides "a physical, human, legal, and spiritual 
reality that embodies the history, the dreams and the aspirations of Indian people, their commu- 
nities, and their tribes." Id. 
232. Id. at 250-51. See also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 7-8, 11-15 (1995) 
[hereinafter BRAID OF FEATHERS]. For a discussion of the role and language of "place" in West- 
e m  Apache culture, see KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES (1996). 
233. Place, supra note 18, at 251 (citations omitted). Professor Pommersheim noted: "Land is 
inherent to Indian people: they often cannot conceive of life without it. They are part of it and it 
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Reservations, once viewed as desolate waste-land~:~~ today serve at 
least three essential, interrelated purposes: cultural identity, political sov- 
ereignty, and the potential for economic well-being.235 The tribes' political 
authority over their reservation lands and resources has helped Indian Na- 
tions keep their cultures The economic potential of reservations 
is also critical to the continued viability of tribes as cultural and political 
comrnunitie~.~~'  Further, unlike the majority Anglo-American culture, 
given the unique nature of tribal culture and land tenure systems, tribes 
cannot simply relocate to new areas when they are precluded from utilizing 
and enjoying reservation lands and resources for any reason, whether it be 
environmental degradation or the development constraints imposed by the 
ESA.238 
Reservation lands can most readily maintain their value and character 
as critical habitat for Indian Nations if tribal environmental priorities, 
which flow from tribal knowledge and ecological values, play the preemi- 
nent role in preserving and utilizing reservation resources. Policies flowing 
from the environmental knowledge possessed by indigenous peoples239 are 
is part of them; it is their Mother." Id. at 250. See also N. Scott Momaday, A First American 
Views His Land, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July 1976, at 14 [hereinafter First American] ("The earth is 
our mother. The sky is our father."). Perhaps the most famous expression of an American In- 
dian's stewardship ethic and reverence for the land is attributed to Chief Seal'th (anglicized as 
"Seattle"), of the Duwamish: "Every part of this soil is sacred in the estimation of my people . . . 
its verdant valleys, its murmuring rivers, its magnificent mountains, sequestered vales and ver- 
dant-lined lakes and bays . . . ." INDIAN ORATORY: FAMOUS PEECHES BY NOTED INDIAN 
CHIEFTAINS 120-21 (W.C. Vanderworth ed. 1971) (cited in ECOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICA 24 
(Donald Grinde and Bruce Johansen eds. 1995) (noting that the exact translation of Seal'th's 
environmental message has been disputed). 
234. GETCHES ET *L., supra note 20, at 22. Indian reservations are some of the most impov- 
erished areas in the nation. Id. See BMID OF FEATHERS, supra note 232, at 11 & n.1; Huffman, 
supra note 202, at 909-10. Four of the eight poorest counties in the United States are located on 
Indian reservations in South Dakota: Shannon County, on the Pine Ridge Reservation; Buffalo 
County, on the Crow Creek Reservation; Ziebach County, on the Cheyenne River Reservation; 
and Todd County, on the Rosebud Reservation, rank first, second, fifth and eighth poorest, re- 
spectively. BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra, at 11 n.1 & 162 n.1 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979 County per Capita Income Figures Released by Census 
Bureau from the 1980 Census (1983)). According to the 1990 census, more than 30% of Ameri- 
can Indians, including those who live both on- and off-reservation, live below the poverty level. 
GETCHES ET AL., supra, at 16. 
235. AMBLER, supra note 200, at 1-2, 6-8. 
236. Id. at 8. See also Place, supra note 18, at 268 (quoting Gerald Clifford, Oglala Sioux: 
"[Olur relationship to one another as Lakota are defined by our relationship to the earth[.] Until 
we get back on track in our relationship to the earth, we cannot straighten out any of our rela- 
tionships to ourselves, to other people."). 
237. See Place, supra note 18, at 269. The history of removal, allotment and assimilation, and 
termination nearly severed the bonds to the land and "eradicat[ed] . . . an economic relation to it 
as a material provider of sustenance." Id. The economic role of the land, no less than its spiritual 
and healing roles, "must be resuscitated." Id. 
238. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 745. Wood noted that: "The transcience and mo- 
bility that provide short-term solutions to members of the majority society do not provide options 
to tribes when their way of life is threatened." Id. 
239. The term "indigenous people" is typically used in reference to "'original inhabitants of 
traditional lands' who maintain their traditional values, culture, and way of life." Tsosie, supra 
note 46, at 272 (citing Simon Brascoupe, Indigenous Perspectives on International Development, 
AKWE:KON J . ,  Summer 1992, at 6, 8). 
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far superior to  centralized "cookie-cutter" federal policies.240 An intimate 
relationship with the land and its inhabitants has, in many cases, given rise 
to sustainable ecological values,241 comprised of both a land ethic242 and 
scientific knowledge resulting from generations of environmental 
interaction.243 
Professor Tsosie, building on the work of numerous scholars, including 
Ronald Trosper, described an indigenous ecological value system based on 
holistic concepts of relationships, respect and connectivity between humans 
and the natural There are four fundamental aspects of this sys- 
240. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 273, 312. For detailed discussions of indigenous ecological 
knowledge, see id.; VINE DELORIA, JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE 
MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC FACT, 47-50,232-33 (1997); LaDuke, supra note 48, at 127; First American, 
supra note 233, at 17-18. For compendia of vignettes and essays reflecting the environmental 
expertise of indigenous peoples internationally, see T R A D I ~ O N A L  ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: A 
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Robert E. Johannes ed. 1989) and DAVID SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON, 
WISDOM OF THE ELDERS: SACRED NAT~VE STORIES OF NATURE (1992). 
241. There is always a danger of making categorical statements about the attributes of groups 
as diverse as American Indian tribes, who have wide-ranging experiences and unique identities. 
For the purposes of this article, however, I do  make some general assumptions about indigenous 
ecological knowledge and environmental ethics, based on the work of numerous scholars who 
have drawn useful parallels among indigenous peoples, including American Indians, and their 
environmental beliefs and practices. See, e.g., SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 241, at xxxv, 16- 
18; Christopher Vescey, American Indian Environmental Religions, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVI- 
RONMENTS: ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Christopher Vescey & Rob- 
ert Venables e d ~ .  1980) [hereinafter American Indian Environments]; Randy Kapashesit & 
Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protection, 36 MCGILL L.J. 
925, 929-32 (1991); LaDuke, supra note 48, at 127, 147-78; First American, supra note 233, at 14, 
17-18; Ronald Trosper, Traditional American Indian Economic Policy, 19 AMER. INDIAN CUL- 
TURE AND REs. J. 65,67-69 (1995). See also LINDA CLARKSON ET AL., OUR RESPONS~BILITY O 
THE SEVENTH GENERATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 4-5, 65 
(1992) (finding "respect for the earth and all creation" fundamental to indigenous societies every- 
where); Tsosie, supra note 46, at 271-87 (concluding that similarities may stem from fact that 
American Indian cultures had "land-based" rather than "market-based'' economies, and had sim- 
ilar experiences with European contact, and accepting Trosper's model of indigenous environ- 
mental values); Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1074 (noting that in developing a position with 
regard to the implementation or revision of the ESA, tribes agreed that efforts should "build 
upon principles of holistic management, sustained utilization of resources, spirituality and con- 
tinuity of unique cultures and beliefs, and stewardship"). Cf: Place, supra note 18, at 269 (noting 
the land "evokes the fundamental Lakota aspirations to live in harmony with Mother Earth and 
to embody the traditional virtues of wisdom, courage, generosity, and fortitude"). 
242. See ALDO LEOPALD, A SAND C o u ~ n  ALMANAC 224-25 (1949). 
243. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 273 & nn. 267-68. Many American Indians have a reverence 
for the land and a unique "perception that is acquired only in the course of many generations." 
First American, supra note 229, at 17 (Momaday illustrated this point with Kiowa and Jemez 
Pueblo experiences). Professor Tsosie concluded that Western science, which had "long been 
dismissive" toward indigenous ecological knowledge, "is beginning to change as scientists are 
beginning to realize that indigenous peoples have developed systems to understand and work 
with their environments that are often vastly more complex than those understood by Western 
scientists," for example, knowledge of the healing properties of certain plants, and that music can 
assist the growth of plants, id. at n.262. See generally DELORIA, supra note 240, at 44-45; LaDuke, 
supra note 48, at 127; SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 240, at xxvii-xliv, 11-22. The ecological 
knowledge of First Peoples is not a "romantic idea[] of an extinct past that ha[s] no relevance to 
modem urban dwellers. [It] endure[s] and holds the key to our sanity and survival." Id. at xxxiv 
(emphasis supplied). Modern science alone "is not enough to solve the planetary crisis"; humility 
and reverence for life is crucial. SUZUKI & KNUDTSON at XXX-xxxi. 
244. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 276-87 (providing a detailed examination of these values in an 
effort to understand tribal environmental decision-making). See also Trosper, supra note 241, at 
67-69; Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1135 & n.3, 1153 (discussing concepts of harmony and 
humility, common to the Navajo, Apache and other tribes, and noting that "Indians have many 
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tem: (1) a perception of the earth as an animate being; (2) an understand- 
ing of human kinship with other living beings; (3) a belief that reciprocity 
and balance extend to present and future generations of humans, and be- 
tween humans and the natural world; and (4) a concept of "belonging" to 
the land.245 
These traditional ecological values lend themselves to sustainable re- 
source a common objective in most federal natural resource stat- 
utes, including the ESA,247 and a cornerstone of the more recent 
international declarations.248 Indeed, many indigenous peoples advocate a 
concept of sustainability to ensure the survival of the land and its resources, 
and the people who rely on them, for seven generations.249 Even if the 
concept of sustainability were not expressly voiced, "[flor Indian peoples, 
who traditionally interpreted their relationship with the land and with fu- 
ture generations as holistic, cyclical, and permanent, sustainability [is] the 
natural result, if not the conscious goal, of deeply rooted environmental 
ethics and traditional land-based economies."250 
There is persuasive evidence that tribes, guided by traditional ecologi- 
ways to imagine and act upon this intimate relation between the spiritual, physical, and social 
worlds, but all of them basically boil down to a deep and abiding reverence for the land that 
sustains the interconnected worlds of the tribe"). 
245. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 276 11.286. These four tenants "are fluid and overlap to a great 
extent." Id. 
246. Sustainability is defined in international instruments as development that "meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs." UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR 
COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The concept entails a "rate of 
consumption the will ensure a constant supply of resources." Tsosie, supra note 46, at 286. See 
OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra, at 43-49. Similarly, federal statutes define "sustained yield" as 
"the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output 
of .  . . renewable resources. . . without impairment of the productivity of the land." Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (1994). See Federal Lands Policy and Management Act, 
43 U.S.C. 5 1702(h) (1994). 
247. See National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600(3), 1604(e) (1994); Multiple- 
Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1994); Federal Lands Policy and Management Act, 43 
U.S.C. 8 1701(a)(7) (1994). See also 25 U.S.C. $8 466,3104(b) (1994) (Secretary of Interior must 
manage Indian forest lands in accordance with the sustained yield principle); 25 C.F.R. 9 166.2 -.3 
(1997) (sustained yield objective applies to grazing leases on Indian lands). The ESA advances 
sustainability through its conservation objective, see Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1531(b) (1994), but, in contrast to the other statutes, prioritizes a single resource or species in a 
largely non-holistic regime. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(l)(B). 
248. The 1992 Declaration on Environment and Development ("Rio Declaration"), U.N. 
Doc. AICONF. ~S~ /PC/WG. I I I IR~V.~  (April 2, 1992), explicitly embraces sustainable resource 
development as a primary objective. See also princ. 1, 3-5. In comparison, the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. AfCONF. 
48114lRev.l (1972), does not refer to "sustainability" per se, but includes related goals and objec- 
tives in many of its provisions. See also princ. 2 (safeguard natural resources for present and 
future generations); princ. 5 (use nonrenewable resources in a manner which guards against fu- 
ture exhaustion); princ. 13 (development should be compatible with environmental protection 
and improvement). 
249. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 288; CLARKSON ET AL., supra note 241, at 14-15, 58-59, 63- 
65. 
250. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 287-88. The American Indian philosophy of permanence "com- 
mits the people to a permanent existence in harmony with everything around them . . . [and] 
explains the[ir] success . . . in surviving in America for thousands of years." Getches, supra note 
216, at 54-68, in GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 20, at 33. This philosophy lends itself to use of the 
earth's resources "with a sensitive touch." Id. at 34. 
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cal values, have been able to do a better job at managing their natural 
resources than did the BIA.251 Several tribes have adopted innovative tim- 
ber programs, which reduce annual harvest from former BIA-established 
quantities and restrict the use of clearcutting as a harvest method.252 The 
White Mountain Apache, for example, guided by a tradition of steward- 
ship, have cut timber harvest on their reservation nearly in half from BIA 
levels.253 Tribes have also adopted progressive wildlife codes governing 
hunting and fishing on Indian sustainable, community-based agri- 
cultural methods adapted to the unique reservation and 
stringent water quality standards to protect fisheries and tribal 
Thus, tribal environmental priorities and values provide the most ap- 
propriate vehicle for effectuating cultural identity, political sovereignty and 
economic well-being through the use and preservation of reservation 
lands. ESA enforcement in Indian Country, particularly with respect to 
critical habitat designations, must be consistent with tribal values and pri- 
orities, with tribes as full partners in the decision-making process. 
3. Distributive Justice 
The inequities inherent in forcing tribes to bear a disproportionate 
251. See Getches, supra note 216, at 34; Tsosie, supra note 46, at 231; Bilateralism, supra note 
97, at 1070. See also GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 652 (citing Angelo A. Iadarola, Indian 
Timber: Federal or Self-Management? (1979) (BIA management of tribal forests has ranged 
from "mediocre to abysmal"); Gover & Walker, supra note 200, at 939 (describing the tribal 
waste code adopted by the Campo Band of Mission Indians as equally or more stringent than 
applicable federal laws - "the most stringent and aggressive environmental program in Califor- 
nia"); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA's approval 
of stringent water quality standards established by the Pueblo of Isleta, which would require 
expensive upgrades to the City's wastewater treatment plant upstream). Cf. AMBLER, supra note 
200, at 261 (the consistently recurring federal policy of treating Indian lands and resources like 
federal public lands and resources "has resulted in persistent inequities toward and exploitation 
of ~ndians"). 
252. See, e.g., Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 54-56 (noting that the tribal resource 
management plan utilizes uneven aged management and prevents harvest on steep slopes); 
Tsosie, supra note 46, at 296 (noting sustainable, traditional forestry practices adopted by Me- 
nominee Tribe of Wisconsin); Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1070-71 (discussing examples of tim- 
ber programs, which, inter alia, reduce annual harvest and/or restrict clearcutting, adopted by the 
White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Yakama Nation and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe). 
253. See Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. The White Mountain Apache Tribal Council has 
reduced allowable timber harvest from 92 million board feet to 57 million board feet, and can- 
celed several old growth timber sales due to cultural and environmental concerns. Id. The Chair- 
man observed that: "We are now in the process of repairing the extensive damages that were 
done to our grazing lands, forests and riparian areas." Id. 
254. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 325 (1983) (holding that the State may not su- 
perimpose its hunting and fishing requirements on non-members on reservation where Apache 
had adopted comprehensive fish and game code; exercise of concurrent jurisdiction would disrupt 
the tribal regulatory scheme and impede Congress' objective of encouraging self-governance). 
See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1070. See also notes 308-310 and accompanying text, infra, for 
a dicussion of the effectiveness of tribal conservation measures for protection of wildlife and 
fisheries. The majority of tribes have their own natural resources agencies, and, while many are 
chronically under funded, most have well-trained, highly motivated staff. 
255. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 295-96 (discussing Zuni project which implements tradi- 
tional methods suitable for arid desert environment). 
256. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 427; Montana v. United States EPA, 941 F. 
Supp. 945 (D. Mont. 1996), affd,  137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding EPA regulations treat- 
ing tribes as states for purposes of promulgating water quality standards). 
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conservation burden provide a final reason that designations should not 
include Indian lands except as a last resort. In many, if not most, cases, fish 
and wildlife species have been brought to the brink of extinction by non- 
Indian development activities. Indian Nations, whose reservation lands are 
now enclaves of suitable habitat, should not be forced to forego economic 
opportunities to compensate for the effects of past development and 
habitat degradation. 
The concept of distributive justice, at  base, promotes "the equal distri- 
bution of wealth and resources throughout so~iety."~" The principles of 
distributive justice as applied to environmental law dictate that the burdens 
of conservation are borne by those who benefitted from activities which 
drove species toward extinction and degraded their habitat.258 
There are many compelling examples of distributive and environmen- 
tal injustice in Indian The experiences of the White Mountain 
Apache are informative. The reservation, which includes five ecosystem 
zones ranging from arid desert to sub-alpine forest, is home to many sensi- 
tive and listed wildlife species. According to Chairman Lupe's testimony 
before a Senate Committee, 
The species found on our reservation that are listed as 'endan- 
gered' are rare because there are few healthy habitats elsewhere . . . . 
Those who sought to impose the ESA upon our Tribe and our aborig- 
inal lands[]. . . had long ago exterminated native animals and plants 
257. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 241 11.82 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 120-21 (1988)). 
258. Distributive justice became front page news recently during negotiations leading toward 
an international global warming treaty. See Karen Breslaw, Running on Fumes, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 
8, 1997, at 31; Martha M. Hamilton & Clay Chandler, Global Warming's Tough Economic Trade- 
Offs, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY EDITION, Dec. 1, 1997, at 8; Nicholas D. Kristof, Asian Pollu- 
tion is Widening its Deadly Reach, NEW YORK TIMES, NOV. 29, 1997, at A l .  See also Clinton Plan 
Would Return to 1990 Levels, Require Developing Country Role, 28 ENV'T RPTR. (BNA) 1237-39 
(Oct. 24, 1997) (United States would not adopt plan to  combat global warming without participa- 
tion of developing countries). One of the most hotly contested issues is the extent to which 
developing countries will be made to bear the burden of environmental degradation and ozone 
depletion caused, in large part, by industrialized countries' resource development, and in particu- 
lar their use of fossil fuels for energy and economic growth. See Hamilton & Chandler, supra, at 
8-9. This is not an isolated phenomenon, either internationally or domestically - the "inability 
to promote the common interest in sustainable development is often a product of the relative 
neglect of economic and social justice within and amongst nations." OUR COMMON FUTURE, 
supra note 246, at 49. 
259. The term "environmental justice" is frequently used in reference to the movement to 
remedy past inequities in the siting of multiple sources of contaminants near minority and disad- 
vantaged communities and in the enforcement of environmental violations. See Executive Order 
No. 12,898 on Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low Income Population, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). While these issues do affect Indian tribes, 
tribal concerns are unique, in large part because of their sovereign status. See Dean Suagee, 
Turtle's War Party: An Indian Allegory on Environmental Justice, 9 J .  ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461 
(1994). See also Summer, supra note 180, at 377 (noting that "The most cherished civil rights of 
Indian people are not based on equality of treatment under the Constitution and the general civil 
rights laws. . . . Indian rights derive from different sources . . ." including treaties, statutes, execu- 
tive orders and the "special trust relationship with the United States"). In addition, tribal envi- 
ronmental interests are unique in that environmentally important sites may also be sacred sites to 
some tribes. See Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1152 (discussing Apache's opposition to construc- 
tion of telescopes on Mt. Graham). In this article, the term "environmental injustice" is used to 
describe the inequitable allocation of conservation burdens. 
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and had erected cities of concrete and steel where prairies, wetlands, 
and other wildlife habitat once existed.260 
Not too surprisingly, given the rural and relatively undeveloped condi- 
tion of the White Mountain Apache reservation vis-a-vis surrounding ar- 
eas, critical habitat for a variety of listed species, including the Mexican 
Spotted Owl, loach minnow and razorback sucker, was proposed to include 
reservation lands.261 Chairman Lupe predicted that the designations would 
undermine the goals of tribal governance, self-determination and economic 
self-sufficiency by paralyzing the tribe's resource development activities, in- 
cluding its sawmill, cattle industry, ski area and other recreational facilities, 
and, indeed, by undermining "our entire wildlife and land-management 
philosophy."262 The FWS ultimately excluded the White Mountain and Ji- 
carilla Apache Reservations from the Mexican Spotted Owl designation 
because the Tribes adopted conservation plans or agreements which re- 
moved threats to the species.263 
The effects of the final Mexican Spotted Owl designation were felt 
more heavily by the Southern Ute Tribe. A t  the time of the decision, the 
Tribe had not submitted a conservation plan, but had engaged in discus- 
sions with the Service to develop a Memorandum of Understanding to fa- 
cilitate overall communications between the Service and the Tribe.264 
Citing a lack of data, the service refused to exclude Southern Ute lands; it 
ultimately included over 61,500 acres of the Southern Ute's reservation in 
the designated area.265 
In a lawsuit filed in federal district court in Colorado, the Tribe alleged 
that the designation would interfere with its right to manage its trust lands 
and resources, and in turn harm economic stability and growth, in violation 
of the trust responsibility and various federal statutes including NEPA, the 
260. Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. The Chairman added that the application of the 
ESA to Indian people and their lands provides "private parties with narrow self-serving agendas" 
with an avenue for controlling the tribe's "destiny and that of our aboriginal and ancestral home- 
land." Id. 
261. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,380 (1994) (San Juan River fishes); 60 Fed. Reg. 29,914, 
29,919 (1995) (Mexican Spotted Owl). 
262. Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. 
263. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,929-31. See Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. Notably, the White 
Mountain Apache is the only tribe to date which has successfully entered into a government-to- 
government Statement of Relationship with the FWS on enforcement of the ESA. See Tribe 
Tells Congressional Committee How it Forged Landmark Agreement, FORT APACHE SCOUT, Aug. 
4, 1995, at 1. The Tribe's Statement of Relationship provided guidance in crafting the Secretarial 
Order on Tribe Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species. See Bilateralism, supra 
note 97, at 1074. 
264. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,930. 
265. Id. at 29,919, 29,932. This represents 21% of the Tribes' total land base. GEORGE L. 
RUSSELL, A MAP OF AMERICAN INDIAN ATIONS (1993). Slightly less than 20% of the total 
designated area, 4,632,901 acres, is within the boundaries of the Southern Ute and other Indian 
reservations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,921, while 83% consists of federal public lands. Id. at 29,917. In 
comparison, the designation blankets minuscule amounts of state land (9,800 acres) and private 
lands (111,500 acres). Id. at 29,919. Significantly, the Secretarial Order expressly states that 
agencies must recognize that Indian lands are not to be treated as if they were federal public 
lands. Secretarial Order $ 5, princ. 2. 
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ESA, and the Federal Timber Management Declarations submitted 
by the Tribe in support of its request for injunctive relief alleged that the 
prohibition of federal activities related to tribal timber harvest, coal mining 
and oil and gas development within the area of the Reservation designated 
as critical habitat would likely render the Tribe unable to develop its re- 
s o u r c e ~ , ~ ~ ~  and that the economic effects resulting from such a restriction 
"would be devastating to the Tribe."268 The Service's economic study, pre- 
pared to support the designation decision and satisfy the requirements of 
ESA 5 4(b)(2), acknowledged that the decision could have adverse effects 
on rural economies dependent on logging,269 including economically de- 
pressed Indian Nations, where logging is a significant source of income.270 
Yet, according to the record of decision, there is no evidence that owls are 
present on the reservation,2" and the Tribe argued further that "the physi- 
cal and biological features of suitable owl habitat" are not present on the 
reservation.272 
After the Tribe filed its complaint and motion for summary judgment, 
but before a decision was rendered, the Mexican Spotted Owl designation 
was set aside by a district court in New Mexico on the grounds that FWS 
had failed to prepare NEPA analysis for the designation decision, following 
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Catron County Board of Commissioners v. 
U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service.273 The court granted the United States7 mo- 
266. Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5. The Tribe alleged that the designation interfered 
with its interest "in the conservation of wild animals and their habitats and . . . [its] authority to 
implement tribal policies for the protection of wildlife." Southern Ute Complaint, supra, at 'j[ 27. 
See Ute Tribe Accuses Federal Government of Violating Treaty, O n s w ~  NEWS, June 14, 1996, at 2. 
267. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,927 (1995). 
268. Id. at 29,926. It was noted that: "Reduced Tribal timber harvest would account for the 
loss of 95 of 120 jobs lost in the Solid Wood and Paper sector (80 percent of direct employment 
losses), and 12 of 27 jobs lost in other sectors (44 percent of indirect employment losses [due to 
reduced spending by employers and firms])." Id. See also Owl Habitat's Impact Debated, Log- 
ging Job Loss May Hurt, Some Say, DENVER POST, Mar. 15,1995, at B2 (quoting Jennifer Fowler- 
Propst of the Fish and Wildlife Service, "[wle particularly need to look closer at the possible hit 
on jobs on Indian nations7'). 
269. Declaration of Robert J. Zahradnik, Energy Exploration and Production Manager for 
the Southern Ute Tribe, q[ 16 and Declaration of James M. Olguin, Chief of Natural Resources 
Division for the Tribe, 'l[ 10, attached to the Tribes' Motion for Summary Judgment, Sept. 12, 
1996, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 96-M-1369 (copy on file 
with author). See also Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 28-30. 
270. Declaration of Robert J. Zahradnik at ¶ 14, Southern Ute (No. 96-M-1369). See also 
Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, 28, 30, 74-75 (activities affected by the designation 
provide over 90 percent of the Tribe's revenues). Mr. Olguin stated that the prohibition on tim- 
ber management in the designated area would result not only in financial harm, but could also 
cause overcrowded and unhealthy forest conditions, increasing the likelihood of catastrophic fire 
and environmental damage. Declaration of Olguin at 10, Southern Ute (No. 96-M-1369). See 
also Southern Ute Complaint, supra, 1 26. Moreover, the restrictions imposed by designation are 
unnecessary because the Tribe already utilizes uneven aged management, which is considered by 
FWS to be the "silvicultural method most compatible with maintenance of [owl] habitat." Id. ¶¶  
54-55. 
271. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,917. 
272. Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 266, ¶ 23. 
273. Coalition of Arizonamew Mexico Counties for Stable Growth v. United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service, CIV 95-1285, slip op. at 2 (D.N.M. Apr. 1,1997) (citing Catron County, 75 F.3d 
at 1429). At issue in all three cases was whether NEPA analysis is required for a decision to 
designate critical habitat under the ESA. The Catron County decision created a split in the cir- 
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tion to dismiss the Southern Ute case, on the grounds that the claims are 
moot as the critical habitat designation is no longer in place and will not be 
enforced in the Tenth 
A final example involves the critical habitat designation for four Colo- 
rado River Basin fish a large proportion of which is on tribal 
land.276 Although tribes situated in the Four Corners region of the South- 
west - Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona - possess senior water 
rights in the San Juan they have only recently received funding to 
develop reclamation projects in order to utilize those rights.278 Meanwhile, 
huge federal reclamation projects have already been constructed, largely 
for the benefit of non-Indian downstream users. These projects have 
wrought dramatic changes to the Colorado River system, including the San 
Juan River tributary, resulting in severe declines of native fish 
In preparing the economic study for the critical habitat designation, 
FWS assumed that all new development in the upper Basin would be pre- 
cluded by the designation decision.280 Thus, designation could effectively 
destroy the tribes' ability to exercise their senior water rights while al- 
lowing the water to continue flowing downstream for the benefit of junior 
users.281 In other words, the tribes are being required to bear a dispropor- 
tionate burden imposed by the ESA's protections for the habitat of listed 
species.282 
cuits, as the Ninth Circuit had previously held that no such analysis was required for environmen- 
tally beneficial actions which are extensively analyzed under the specific factors set forth in the 
ESA. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1495. 
274. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 96-M-1369, slip op. at 2 
(D. Colo. Apr. 4, 1998). See 63 Fed. Reg. 14,378 (Mar. 25, 1998) (revoking designations for owl, 
loach minnow and spikedace). 
275. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razor- 
back Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 
(1994). 
276. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1331 n.216 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,384 (1994)). 
277. See id. Indian tribes possess federally reserved water rights as of the date their reserva- 
tion was created pursuant to the "Winters Doctrine." See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 
577 (1908). While this makes their rights senior to most appropriators, many tribes, like these 
four southwestern tribes, have been unable to fully utilize their existing rights. However, Indian 
reserved rights, unlike water rights of other users in most western appropriative rights systems, 
are not subject to forfeiture or abandonment for non-use. Id. at 577. The quantification of the 
reserved rights is based on "practicably irrigable acreage," which accounts for both present and 
future water needs. See Arizona v. United States, 373 U.S. 564, 600-01 (1963). 
278. See generally Hansen, supra note 66 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the ESA's 
restrictions on development of Indian water rights). 
279. Id. See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS 
DISAPPEARING WATER, 120-44,255-305,439-76 (1993) (describing the history and effects of rec- 
lamation on the Colorado River system). 
280. Id. at 1331. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,380 (1994). 
281. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1306. 
282. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 240-41. Professor Tsosie noted that: "Although certain fish 
species in the San Juan River are endangered because of non-Indian development, such as diver- 
sion of water for non-Indian water projects, the Indian nations, who have historically been ig- 
nored, are forced to bear the burdens imposed by the ESA." Id. See also Hansen, supra note 66, 
at 1331 (tribes, prohibited from developing their water rights because of listings and critical 
habitat designations under the ESA, have been made to "bear a disproportionate burden of the 
protection of endangered species"). 
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The response of the tribes was two-fold. A few months after the 
designation decision, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Southern Ute Tribe, Ji- 
carilla Apache Tribe and the Navajo Nation served a Notice of Intent to 
Sue on the Secretary of the Interior, alleging, inter alia, that FWS had failed 
to consider the effect of on tribal economies as required by ESA § 4(b)(2), 
and that the subordination of tribal interests to the ESA violated fiduciary 
In addition, the tribes proposed amendments to the regulations 
implementing the ESA, recommending that the FWS may not designate 
critical habitat affecting tribal interests if other conservation alternatives 
are possible that would protect tribal interests.284 
A review of other recent designation decisions yields mixed results. In 
two pre-Secretarial Order designations for the Marbled Murrelet and 
Northern Spotted Owl, tribal lands were excluded, along with private 
lands, on the grounds that the benefits of inclusion were marginal because 
the lands in question provided only minimal habitat.285 The decision to 
designate critical habitat for the Marbled Murrelet specifically referenced 
the federal trust responsibility as an additional reason for exclusion.286 
However, other decisions which pre-date the Order included tribal lands 
without any finding of the need for their habitat in comparison to sur- 
rounding landholdings, much less any determination that inclusion would 
be "essential" for the species.287 
Perhaps most troubling of all is the designation for the Southwest Wil- 
low Flycatcher, the only post-Order decision directly affecting Indian lands 
to date. There, Yavapai-Apache and Pala Mission Tribes were given some 
283. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1330 (citing Notice of Intent to Sue at 2 (dated June 28,1994) 
[hereinafter Notice]). See Brenda Norrell, Endangered Species Act Hinders Tribal Development, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, NOV. 10, 1994, at A6 (reporting that Navajo Nation had filed a notice 
of intent to sue the United States over the designation of critical habitat for San Juan River 
fishes). 
284. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1330-31 (citing Notice, supra note 283, at 4). For a discussion 
of recent proposals for ESA amendments, see supra notes 74 & 139. In addition, the Southern 
Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes support a bill, the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights 
Act Amendments of 1998, S. 1771 and H.R. 3478, to modify the Animas-La Plata Project (A-LP), 
which was designed to meet the water needs of the Tribes and others pursuant to a settlement 
agreement approved by Congress in 1988. The A-LP has been delayed, in part, because of ESA 
prohibitions. "Among the tribal projects planned to develop San Juan River water, the Animas- 
La Plata project has been the most conspicuous victim of ESA-based preemption." Hansen, 
supra note 66, at 1327. The proposed Amendments provide for a reclamation project about one- 
third the size of the original A-LP. See Electa Draper, Animus-La Plata Down to Wire, Denv. 
Post, Sept. 17, 1998, at B6. 
285. See Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796, 
1805, 1808, 1826 (1992) (excluding all tribal and private lands); Final Designation of Critical 
Habitat for the Marbled Murrelet, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,256, 26,266 (1996) (excluding tribal lands of 
the Hoopa, Makah, Siletz and Quinault Indian Tribes). 
286. 61 Fed. Reg. at 26,266. It was recognized that: "Quinault lands . . . were not included . . . 
after consideration of the Federal government's trust responsibilities and the options for achiev- 
ing essential conservation contributions through other alternatives." Id. 
287. See, e.g., Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mojave population of the Desert Tor- 
toise, 59 Fed. Reg. 5820,5827, 5844 (1997). As discussed above, the final rule designating critical 
habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl included Southern Ute lands without finding that their 
inclusion was essential for conservation of the species; conversely, it states that no owls were 
known to be present on the Southern Ute reservation but that "occupied habitat on adjacent 
lands indicate owls may occur on Reservation land." See 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,917. 
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consideration in the decision-making process, but their lands were not ulti- 
mately excluded from the designation.288 At least twenty million acres of 
tribal lands in Arizona alone were included, representing twenty-eight per- 
cent of the designated area in that state.289 Although the final rule gives 
passing reference to the Secretarial Order's requirements, it fails to make 
any of the required findings regarding the "essential" nature of habitat on 
tribal lands as compared to surrounding non-Indian lands.290 In fact, the 
rule and its environmental assessment provide no analysis of any of the 
Order's  requirement^.^^' Moreover, it appears that only the most cursory 
consultation with affected tribes occurred.292 If a court were to review this 
decision with the Secretarial Order's requirements as its backdrop, the fail- 
ure to consult and to consider alternatives other than designation of tribal 
lands would provide grounds for setting aside the designation.293 
The designation of critical habitat in Indian Country raises a special 
concern under distributive justice principles because designation has a 
more marked effect on Indian lands than it does on private lands. When 
critical habitat designations include Indian lands, Section 7 consultation re- 
quirements, which apply only when some federal nexus is present (such as 
BIA approval of contracts or leases), are especially likely to pose a serious 
288. 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135. 
289. Environmental Assessment, Designation of Critical Habitat for Southwestern Willow 
Flycatcher, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (July 3, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Envi- 
ronmental Assessment]. Indian lands in New Mexico and California were also included. Id. As 
is the case with many critical habitat designations, FWS was under a strict court-ordered deadline 
when it issued the final decision for the Flycatcher. 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,130. 
290. See Secretarial Order, Appendix $ 3(B)(4) (prioritizing tribal interests in the designation 
decision). See also Secretarial Order 3 5, princ. 3(C) (requiring equitable distribution of conser- 
vation burdens). 
291. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135; Environmental Assessment, supra note 289. 
292. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135 (noting that FWS consulted with tribes to ensure that tribal 
values were considered, and that the agency plans to remain available to tribes to assist them with 
conservation plans); Environmental Assessment, supra note 289, at 6-7 (description of scoping 
and public participation provides no discussion of tribal involvement). Given the tight schedule 
for designation, it seems unlikely that meaningful participation and full information exchange 
occurred as envisioned by the Secretarial Order. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,130 (stating that, due to 
"unprecedented time constraints resulting from the court order, the Service was not able to pro- 
vide the level of analysis and completeness that it has in the past on such rules. The Service is 
designating critical habitat for the southwestern willow flycatcher as it was proposed in 1993. . ."); 
Environmental Assessment, supra, at 6 (noting lack of economic information and inability to 
perform a complete economic analysis as of February 27, 1995, when the Flycatcher was finally 
listed as endangered, see 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694). 
293. See Motor Vehicles Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42 (finding that failure to consider relevant factors 
renders a decision arbitrary and capricious); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 
at 256 (finding failure to prioritize tribal water rights over those of non-Indian irrigators arbitrary 
and capricious where Secretary simply made "judgment call" to placate irrigators and failed to 
take trust responsibility to Tribe into account); Washington Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1470-72 
(holding that EPA's efforts to promote tribal environmental self-determination by refusing to 
delegate authority for hazardous waste management in Indian Country to State was reasonable, 
given the trust responsibility toward tribes and the federal self-determination policy). The Mexi- 
can Spotted Owl designation would also be vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and capricious 
and a breach of trust. Although the Order does not impose additional requirements for Depart- 
mental actions which are substantially completed, Secretarial Order 9 2(E), if FWS decides to go 
forward with NEPA analysis pursuant to the Coalition of Counties decision and re-designate tri- 
bal lands as critical habitat for the owl, the Order would likely apply. 
19981 INDIAN LANDS AS CRITICAL HABITAT 433 
obstacle to tribal development proposals.294 Because non-Indian develop- 
ment has proceeded at such a rapid pace, and because its effects on wildlife 
habitat are so pervasive, the agencies' current method of determining 
whether or not jeopardy might result from an activity which entails some 
federal involvement under Section 7 is almost pre-ordained to fall more 
heavily on activities on Indian lands.295 In developing a baseline against 
which to measure effects of a proposed action for the purposes of issuing 
Section 7 biological opinions, FWS considers the cumulative impacts of 
past and ongoing actions on the species and its critical habitat.296 More 
recent development proposals by Indian tribes may well be precluded as 
the "straw that broke the camel's back" - the added activity which, given 
past and ongoing non-Indian activities, jeopardizes the species or imper- 
missibly degrades its habitat. 
FWS should undertake affirmative steps to ascertain potential tribal 
development rights whenever possible when consulting on federal actions 
which implicate Indian interests.297 In some areas of resource develop- 
ment, in particular water resources development, it is possible, though diffi- 
cult, to formulate reasoned predictions of the quantity of Indian reserved 
water rights, even if they are not yet being utilized.298 While it may not 
always be possible to predict tribal development plans, the Secretarial Or- 
der's requirements for "the earliest possible notification" and involvement 
of tribes would help, if fully implemented by the agencies. 
- 
294. See Tim Vollman, The Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Righrs, 11 NAT. RE- 
SOURCES & ENV'T 39, 41 (1996) (Section 7 has been seen as a "significant procedural and sub- 
stantive obstacle to development"). Critical habitat designations in Indian Country can be said to 
represent the trust responsibility "turning in on itself" - the primary reason that critical habitat 
presents significant on-the-ground obstacles as applied to Indian lands is that the BIA, acting in 
accordance with the trust responsibility as defined by federal mineral and timber management 
statutes, has assumed such extensive authority over activities in Indian Country in the first place. 
Not surprisingly, federal approval procedures sometimes act as both a blessing and a curse. 
295. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 769, 780. 
296. 50 C.F.R. 9 402.02 (1998). 
297. See Vollman, supra note 294, at 43 (noting that tribal rights should be taken into account 
in establishing baseline, and that, in some cases, the exercise of tribal water rights may require 
reinitiation of consultation on ongoing projects). 
298. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 1341-42. Indian reserved water rights should be included in 
the environmental baseline used in issuing Section 7 biological opinions, and the BIA should 
have a responsibility to provide FWS with a "reasonable estimate of the tribe's water right based 
on PIA or other appropriate standard." Id. at 1342. Including projections for future develop- 
ment on Indian lands in baseline analysis, however, will not address the situation where a species' 
need for habitat protections is so great that tribal lands must be included, and all development is 
curtailed. There, neighboring landowners who have enjoyed the benefits of extensive past and on 
going development activities could be required to make payments to tribes who are forced to 
forego tribal resource development. In the water rights arena, Professor Getches has proposed 
that an endangered species surcharge be assessed against beneficiaries who receive the water 
which tribes with senior rights might have developed but for ESA restrictions. See Hansen, supra 
note 66, at 1342 (citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on Water and Power, Committee on 
Energy and Resources (June 9, 1994) (statement of David H. Getches)). A surcharge would, in 
effect, require junior users of tribal water to compensate the tribes for the value of the water, 
which the tribes themselves are not able to use because of ESA constraints, through "involun- 
tary" forbearance agreements. Id. Hansen noted that: "If water cannot be used on the land 
itself to sustain a homeland for the tribes, than the tribes must at least obtain the value of the 
water right. Payments in lieu of water could then be used to develop the reservation economy." 
Id. 
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In contrast to the critical role played by reservation lands and re- 
sources in the survival of Indian Nations, when it comes to imperiled spe- 
cies, critical habitat, in most cases, adds little protection to the ESA's "first 
line" of defense - inclusion on the endangered or threatened species 
list.299 The primary effect of designation is felt in areas which are suitable 
but, as yet, unoccupied by a listed species because degradation of habitat 
which foreseeably harms a listed species known to be present in an area is 
already prohibited as an unlawful "take" under Section 9,300 or as jeopard- 
izing the species, in situations where Section 7 is applicable.301 
In addition to the ESA7s species-related provisions, other federal envi- 
ronmental statutes provide for protection of wildlife habitat in Indian 
Country. For example, NEPA affords important procedural protections for 
"major federal actions" on Indian lands, such as federal permit require- 
ments and BIA approval of development leases.302 NEPA requires exten- 
sive environmental analysis of potential impacts and alternatives, in the 
form of an environmental assessment ("EA"), or, if environmental impacts 
may be significant, a more detailed environmental impact statement 
("EIS").303 
Although NEPA does not force the tribe or the BIA to chose or ap- 
prove the alternative which causes the least impact to a listed species and 
its habitat,304 it does require informed decision-making based on relevant 
environmental factors, one of which is the presence of protected species.305 
In addition, an EIS typically explores possible mitigation measures which 
would avoid or minimize adverse environmental effects.306 By requiring 
- 
299. Declaration of Steven L. Spangle ¶ 6 and Declaration of Gerry Jackson ¶ 6, attached to 
Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Oct. 10, 1996, Southern Ute Indian 
Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 96-M-1369 (explaining that agency's listing priority 
guidance for activities during budget-strapped FY96 and IT97 placed critical habitat designations 
at the lowest priority (Tier 4) because it typically results in only limited conservation benefits 
beyond those protections provided by listing of the species itself). See also 61 Fed. Reg. 24,722 
(1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 48,962 (1996). For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of designation 
and listing of conservation tools which could be more effective and less burdensome, see supra 
notes 101-07. 
300. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. 8 1538(a) (1994). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; Sweet 
Home, 515 U.S. at 690. 
301. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,131-32. 
302. See e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593,596 (10th Cir. 1972). See Gover & Walker, supra 
note 224, at 940-41. See generally Dean Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental 
Policy Act to "Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377 (1991). 
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994). 
304. See Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 556 (upholding environmental impact statement for uranium 
mining). See also Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Az. 1990) (even though 
EIS showed that off-reservation sacred sites would be harmed, court held that NEPA's process- 
oriented duties had been satisfied), affd, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 959 
(1 992). 
305. See 40 C.F.R. 5 1508.27(b)(8). 
306. See Gover & Walker, supra note 224, at 941. 
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thorough consideration of potential consequences and alternatives before 
action is taken, and by involving stakeholders and interested members of 
the public in the decisionmaking process, NEPA provides an important 
layer of environmental protection.307 
Beyond the requirements of federal statutes, additional safeguards can 
be found in the fish and wildlife codes of many tribes, which provide pro- 
tections for imperiled species and their habitat.308 In addition, consistent 
with the traditional ecological values model, many tribal fish and game 
codes provide protections for wildlife and fish species in general, even 
those whose populations are not imperiled.309 Where tribes have been able 
to enact and implement their own resource requirements, either through 
written codes or otherwise, success stories, such as that of the White Moun- 
tain Apache Tribe, abound.310 As Chairman Lupe noted, "We [the White 
Mountain Apache] are self-regulating. If our homeland is destroyed, we 
have nowhere else to go. We will not allow that to happen."311 
This is not to say that there has been, or will be, no environmental 
degradation as a result of mineral or water resource development, timber 
307. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 96, at 361 (NEPA is a "critical element" in land and 
resource management); Andrea L. Hungerford, Comment, Changing the Management of Public 
Lands Forests: The Role of the Spotted Owl Injunctions, 24 ENVTL. L. 1395,1433-34 (1994) (con- 
cluding NEPA has influenced environmental policy in far-reaching ways). 
308. See Lewis, supra note 212, at *6 (noting that the Jicarilla Apache's wildlife program "has 
become a model for the state of New Mexico"); Johnson, supra note 115, at 191 & n.111 (citing 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Ordinance 44D (prohibiting hunting of bald eagles, 
wolves and grizzly bears unless allowed by the tribal cultural committee)); Clinton Critique, supra 
note 21, at 791-92 (discussing salmon restoration plans and policies of Columbia River treaty 
tribes in the Pacific Northwest). See also Brendale, 492 U.S. 408 (zoning ordinance of Yakama 
Indian Nation closed a heavily forested area of the reservation, restricting public access to protect 
water quality and wildlife); Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (describing tribal fish and game 
code); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982) (discuss- 
ing tribal protection of riparian areas to promote water quality and fisheries). 
309. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 300 n.450 (citing ROBERT D. COOTER & WOLFGANG 
FIKENTSCHER, IS THERE INDIAN COMMON LAW? THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN AMERICAN INDIAN 
TRIBAL COURTS 8 (1994)). For example, the Blackfeet Tribe requires members to use the whole 
animal after it is killed: "[wlasting any part of an animal, as trophy hunters do, is a crime on the 
Blackfeet reservation." Id. See also Kapashesit & Klippenstein, supra note 241, at 932-34 (dis- 
cussing Cree's practice of recognizing "hunting bosses" with responsibility for understanding the 
condition of natural resources within a particular area to regulate behavior in that area). Inter- 
tribal groups have also played a significant role in managing trans-jurisdictional species, such as 
salmon and bison. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 213 (1992) (describing technical and scientific expertise of Co- 
lumbia River Intertribal Fish Commission as "second to none" in salmon management); Buffalo 
Pact Will Help an Old Friend, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 28, 1997, at A09 (describing Inter- 
Tribal Bison Cooperative's proposals to resolve controversy caused by exodus of bison, which are 
feared to spread brucellosis to domestic cattle, from Yellowstone Park; bison could be quaran- 
tined and shipped to tribal lands). 
310. Johnson, Honoring Treaty Rights, supra note 115, at 191 11.111-13; Tsosie, supra note 46, 
at 295-96. For a discussion of tribal successes with resources, see supra notes 253-256. 
311. Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. For discussion of the point that American Indians 
have used the land and its resources without destroying it, and will continue to do so, see First 
American, supra note 233, at 18 ("As an Indian I think: 'You say that I use the land, and I reply, 
yes, it is true; but it is not the first truth. The first truth is that I love the land; I see that it is 
beautiful; I delight in it; I am alive in it.'") and Getches, supra note 216, at 34 (noting that tribes, 
"remaining true to their resource preservation values," use the earth's resources "with a sensitive 
touch"). For a further discussion, see supra notes 250-252 and accompanying text. 
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harvest or grazing, even if it proceeds in accordance with tribal norms and 
ecological values. Yet, it is likely that the worst examples of environmental 
harm have flowed directly from the "vagaries of federal policies,"312 partic- 
ularly in the mineral leasing area.313 Realization of tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination will help avoid contamination and destruction of 
habitat, particularly where federal resources are made readily available in 
the form of information exchange, training in wildlife management and sus- 
tainable development, and adequate funding.314 
Finally, federal-tribal co-management initiatives can provide effective 
protections for listed species and their habitat, thereby avoiding the need 
for heavy-handed federal controls.315 Partnerships between tribes and state 
wildlife managers have proven beneficial, both with respect to species con- 
servation and the promotion of inter-governmental  relationship^.^^^ If 
tribes are made full participants with mutual management authority, coop- 
erative agreements, encouraged by the Secretarial Order, can play an im- 
portant role in conserving resources and distributing the burdens of 
protection more equitably. 
CONCLUSION 
Tribal lands are critical habitat, first and foremost, for Indian Nations. 
The use and preservation of reservation lands and resources are essential 
for maintaining tribal sovereignty, as well as economic and cultural viabil- 
ity. The Secretarial Order, if implemented by agencies and enforced by 
federal courts as an expression of the trust responsibility, maintains tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination by requiring meaningful government- 
to-government consultations and prioritizing Indian interests over compet- 
ing interests. 
Although the Order does not strictly preclude designation of critical 
habitat in Indian Country, it does provide significant limitations on agency 
312. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 324; Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1480. 
313. See AMBLER, supra note 200, at 174-92 (describing adverse environmental conditions re- 
sulting from leasing activities at uranium mines and mills and coal mines, and tribal efforts to 
assume regulatory control to protect their land base and tribal health and well-being). There are 
additional factors which have likely contributed to environmental degradation of Indian lands, 
including the decreasing land-base caused by the allotment policy, increasing population, pres- 
sures from Anglo-American markets and values, and perhaps even loss of cultural identity and 
norms. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 310-11. 
314. Chairman Lupe of the White Mountain Apache Tribe explained that one reason his tribe 
had been able to reach a Statement of Relationship on ESA enforcement on Indian lands was 
because FWS acknowledged the Tribe's sovereign authority and capacity to manage its own land 
and resource, and because FWS's technical expertise in wildlife issues was, in turn, recognized as 
a significant resource for the Tribe's management of ecosystems and associated species. Chair- 
man's Corner, supra note 205. He also noted that development of management plans was very 
expensive: "responses to regulatory requirements of the [ESA] unnecessarily deplete our finan- 
cial resources and deflect us from accomplishing our Tribal goals." Id. 
315. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 325 (holding that state conservation efforts were 
preempted where tribe, with cooperation and assistance of federal government, implemented 
comprehensive fish and game management program). 
316. For an examination of partnerships between tribes and state officials, see supra notes 
180-183 and accompanying text. 
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discretion to do so, and effectuates the ESA's requirement that identified 
areas be excluded from designation if the benefits of exclusion outweigh 
the benefits of inclusion. The fulfillment of tribal self-determination and 
the trust responsibility toward Indian lands and natural resources, includ- 
ing other wildlife resources, should weigh heavily in favor of exclusion in 
most cases. As a result, only those areas within Indian Country which are 
truly critical to the survival of an endangered or threatened species, as 
shown by compelling scientific data, will be included within the designa- 
tion, and then only after other possible conservation measures have been 
considered through meaningful consultation with tribes. 
